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REVIEW ESSAY
IS IT POSSIBLE TO TAKE BOTH FETAL LIFE AND




In Abortion: The Clash of Absolutes ("Abortion'), Professor Laurence
Tribe sets for himself a daunting task-to help us as a nation "get beyond
our ... intractable dispute about the question of abortion."' According to
Tribe, the abortion debate as it is currently framed "appears to pose an
insoluble conflict between two fundamental values: the right of a fetus to
live and the right of a woman to determine her own fate."' 2 Consequently,
one seeking ethically to resolve the abortion dilemma seemingly must "nav-
igate like Ulysses between the Scylla of infanticide and the Charybdis of
women's bondage. ' 3
Tribe criticizes this absolutist approach to abortion as reducing one side
or the other "to ghostly anonymity." 4 The prolife side cannot see the plight
of the mother and the prochoice side cannot envision the fetus.' To each
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I. LAURENCE H. TRmE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES 242 (1990).
2. Id. at 27.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 5.
5. Id. We are aware of the ideological arguments that both sides of the controversy
can make concerning the terms "prolife" and "prochoice." See, e.g., Joan Mahoney, The
Continuing Clash, 59 U. CiN. L. REv. 1231, 1235 n.24 (1991) (book review). For the sake of
simplicity, we will refer to each side by the name which it prefers. Tribe does this as well,
which Professor Mahoney refers to as "one of the few examples of a lack of ["clearly pro-
choice"] bias in his work." Id. at 1234. For a prolife writer who cannot bring herself to use
the term "prochoice," see Pat Goodson, 30 WASHBURN L.J. 68, 68 n.l (1990) (book review)
("prochoice label does not reflect the truth that the object of the abortion has no choice").
Concerning the term "fetus," technically it is the label given by medical science to the
unborn at "[n]ine weeks from fertilization ... because 'the main organ systems have been
established' and 'the major features of the external body form are recognizable."' David M.
Smolin, Why Abortion Rights Are Not Justified by Deference to Gender Equality: A Response
to Professor Tribe, 23 J. MARSALL L. Ray. 621, 656-57 (1990) (book review essay) (quoting
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side of the debate the other side becomes an "invisible abstraction." 6 Tribe
suggests that the only way out of this "no-win battle" is to give "voice to
the human reality on each side of the [dispute], keeping both the woman
and the fetus in focus at the same time." '7 While maintaining "respect for
the deepest values on both sides," 8 Tribe seeks to accomplish this by examining
"critically both the pro-choice and the pro-life arguments." 9 He denies any
intent "to 'prove' to anyone the correctness of any particular position in the
abortion debate."' 0 Rather, Tribe's hope is that the current "logjam" may
be loosened as each side recognizes "the strengths of the other's arguments
and the weaknesses of its own.""
Given Professor Tribe's prominence and the vitality of the abortion
controversy, it is not surprising that Abortion has been widely reviewed.' 2 A
T. SADLER, LANGoMA'S MEDICAL EMBRYOLOGY 58 (5th ed. 1985)). The Latin word, however,
"simply means 'offspring' or 'unborn young."' David K. DeWolf, 26 GONZ. L. REv. 257,
259 n.10 (1990/91) (book review) (quoting AMERicA HERITAGE DIcTioNAY 260 (1983)). We
will use the term in this broader sense to refer to unborn humans at all points postconception.
We do not imply by using this somewhat alien-sounding term that the fetus is not a person.
For a discussion of this risk, see STEPHEN D. SciiwAnz, Tm MORAL Qu sTioN OF ABORTION
19 (1990) (the term "fetus ... has a cold scientific neutrality that effectively obscures the
reality and preciousness of the small preborn child"). In fact, we will argue that because a
fetus from conception irrefutably constitutes individual human life, he/she should be viewed
as a person from that event as well.
6. TRIBE, supra note 1, at 5.
7. Id. at 6.
8. See id. at 3.
9. Id. at 7.
10. Id. at 8.
11. Id.
12. While we do not purport to have read every review of Abortion, we have read many.
To assist the reader, we have attempted generally to categorize the reviews (alphabetically
within each category) as "prolife," "prochoice," or "ambiguous" in their perspective toward
abortion rights. We do so with some trepidation, for we know that everyone may not agree
with our reading of a particular review. A case in point involves an assertion in a review of
Abortion by Professor Anita Allen: "Tribe's judicious defense of the liberal pro-choice
perspective has already found favor in surprising quarters. Journalist Nat Hentoff, the self-
described 'atheist civil-libertarian pro-lifer,' praises Tribe's presentation of the right to privacy
as unusually 'lucid."' Anita L. Allen, Tribe's Judicious Feminism, 44 STAN. L. Rav. 179, 179
(1991) (book review essay) (footnote omitted). Allen refers the reader to Hentoff's own review
of Abortion in the Boston Globe. Id. at 179 n.1 (citing Nat Hentoff, Abortion: Seeking a
"Common Ground, BosToN GLOBE, June 10, 1990, at B43).
While Hentoff does commend Tribe for the "lucid ... concise legal education" that
Abortion contains on several "complex elements of law," including "the right to privacy,"
id. at B45, his review says other things too. Hentoff criticizes Tribe for failing "to sufficiently
distance himself from his own clear pro-choice convictions to recognize the chasm between his
approach to the fetus and that of pro-lifers in their various forms." Id. at B43. He also faults
Tribe for sliding "over angry opposition to abortion by many of the early and legendary
American feminists. They thought abortion unnatural and self-debasing for a woman to do
that to her own creation." Id.; see infra note 28 (giving more evidence of early feminists'
opposition to abortion). Finally, Hentoff says that Tribe did not work "hard enough to break
the stereotype of the pro-lifer as a Roman Catholic who never went to Harvard and who, as
Barney Frank put it, is pro-life until the moment of birth and then abandons mother and
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striking characteristic of the reviews is that, regardless of the particular
writer's position on abortion, there is virtually unanimous agreement that
Abortion fails to accomplish its stated objective. Rather than an evenhanded
treatment of the abortion dilemma, most reviewers recognize Abortion to be
essentially a prochoice apologetic. 3
The evidence revealing the prochoice bias of Abortion is overwhelming.
One need look no further than Tribe's unabashed defense of Roe v. Wade,
4
which one prochoice reviewer calls "the most detailed and broad" that she
child." Hentoff, supra, at B45. Hentoff argues that many prolifers agree with Tribe that
society through taxpayer dollars should help women raise their children. See id. Taken together,
these criticisms make it difficult to accept Allen's assessment that Hentoff viewed favorably
"Tribe's judicious defense of the liberal pro-choice perspective."
Recognizing that some may disagree with our own characterizations of others' reviews,
we nonetheless will hazard the attempt.
(A) Prolife reviews: Mary Ann Glendon, Intra-Tribal Warfare, FirST THnGs, Aug.-
Sept. 1990, at 55 (book review); Goodson, supra note 5; Hentoff, supra; Michael W.
McConnell, How Not to Promote Serious Deliberation About Abortion, 58 U. Cm. L. Rv.
1181 (1991) (book review); Smolin, supra note 5.
(B) Prochoice reviews: Allen, supra; Jean Braucher, Tribal Conflict Over Abortion, 25
GA. L. Ray. 595 (1991) (book review); Daniel Callahan, Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of
Compromise, L.A. TMS, July 22, 1990 (Book Review Section), at 1; Celeste M. Condit,
Within the Confines of the Law: Abortion and a Substantive Rhetoric of Liberty, 38 BUFF.
L. REv. 903 (1990) (book review); Robert F. Drinan, Abortion and the Law: A Problem
Without a Solution?, 89 MICH. L. Rnv. 1390 (1991) (book review); Mary C. Dunlap, Mediating
the Abortion Controversy: A Call for Moderation, or for One-Sided Etiquette While the
Bombs Keep Flying?, 30 WAsHBuRN L.J. 41 (1990) (book review); Eugene Gressman, Book
Review, 21 SEToN HALL L. Rnv. 221 (1990); Erwin N. Griswold, Thorough, Careful and Fair,
HARv. L. BuLL. 29 (Summer 1990) (book review); Amy Gutmann, No Common Ground, Tam
NEw REPuBuc, Oct. 22, 1990, at 43 (book review); Mahoney, supra note 5; Isabel Marcus,
Many Realities, Many Words: Abortion and the Struggle Over Meaning, 69 TEx. L. REa.
1259 (1991) (book review).
(C) Ambiguous reviews: Vada Berger, Book Note, 25 HAnv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rav. 625
(1990); Stephen L. Carter, Abortion, Absolutism, and Compromise, 100 YALE L.J. 2747 (1991)
(book review); DeWoIf, supra note 5; Maximilian B. Torres, Book Note, 28 HAgv. J. ON
LEGIs. 282 (1991).
13. For prolife recognition of Tribe's bias, see, e.g., Glendon, supra note 12(A), at 55;
McConnell, supra note 12(A), at 1182-83. For prochoice recognition, see, e.g., Callahan, supra
note 12(B), at 1; Condit, supra note 12(B), at 903; Dunlap, supra note 12(B), at 48 n.30;
Gutmann, supra note 12(B), at 44; Mahoney, supra note 5, at 1232, 1234. But see Griswold,
supra note 12(B), at 29, 30 (Tribe "is not a polemicist"; his assessment of various issues
concerning the fetus "is thorough, careful, and fair."); Marcus, supra note 12(B), at 1262-63
(stating that Tribe writes "in a voice which removes him from the fray"). All of the reviews
which we have labeled "ambiguous" recognize Tribe's prochoice slant. See Carter, supra note
12(C), at 2750; DeWolf, supra note 5, at 258; Berger, supra note 12(C), at 626; Torres, supra
note 12(C), at 289-90.
The fact that Abortion has a prochoice bias does not mean that Tribe escapes criticism
from prochoice reviewers. Professor Jean Braucher, for example, while acknowledging that
Tribe defends the prochoice position, notes that "he does so with great heaves of moral doubt,
in a manner that gives ammunition to the other side." Braucher, supra note 12(B), at 596.
Other instances of prochoice criticism will be noted in the course of this article.
14. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Although the defense of Roe in itself substantiates our point,
other examples of Tribe's prochoice bias will be noted as we proceed.
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has read. 5 Professor Tribe praises Roe because it "reflects the widely shared
sense that we should erase neither the fetus nor the woman from the picture
our law presents.' ' 6 Roe, as a compromise between absolute views, 7 turns
neither "being into a ghost":'8 women are recognized through the right to
abort up until fetal viability, while the possibility of postviability protection
keeps the fetus in view.' 9
Contrary to Tribe's characterization, it is difficult to consider Roe's
impact as anything other than rendering the fetus a "ghost." First, as will
be shown, by Tribe's own standards fetal personhood can be shown to exist
prior to viability.20 Those previable humans killed under the Roe scheme are
undeniably "reduced to ghostly anonymity."12' Second, the protection which
viability actually affords the fetus is illusory. Under Roe, states cannot prohibit
postviability abortions needed by women for "health" reasons.2 In Roe's
companion case, Doe v. Bolton,23 the Court defined "health" as encompassing
"all factors-physical, emotional, psychological, familial, and the woman's
age-relevant to the well-being of the patient." 2 4 Therefore, Roe and Doe
15. Condit, supra note 12(B), at 903.
16. TRIE, supra note 1, at 138.
17. Id. at 12, 78-79, 138.
18. Id. at 138.
19. Id. Much of Abortion is devoted to defending the "constitutional legitimacy," id.
at 129, of Roe. Our article will not address this issue, although it does predominate in several
of the reviews of Abortion. See, e.g., DeWolf, supra note 5 (arguing that Roe was constitu-
tionally illegitimate); Gressman, supra note 12(B) (arguing that Roe was constitutionally
legitimate). A chief reason that we will not focus upon Roe is given by Professors Mensch
and Freeman in their recent tour de force on the abortion controversy: "The effect of Roe's
'tights' formulation of the issue was to render [the] process of moral dialogue abruptly
irrelevant for lawmaking purposes." Elizabeth Mensch & Alan Freeman, The Politics of Virtue:
Animals, Theology and Abortion, 24 GA. L. REv. 923, 932 (1991) (special supplement issue).
Our goal for this article is to contribute to what we hope will be an ongoing "moral dialogue"
about abortion.
As for our own opinion of Roe itself, suffice it to say that we share the view of Mensch
and Freeman that Roe "may be fairly characterized as a mistake for three combined reasons;
it was legally problematic at best, sociologically inaccurate and politically disastrous." Id. at
1120 n.739. On Roe as a political failure, see Carter, supra note 12(C), at 2748. With Roe's
reversal believed by "many on both sides of the debate ... [to be] only a matter of time...
the entire matter of abortion [will be thrown] back to the states." Karen Tumulty, The
Abortions of Last Resort, L.A. Taous, Jan. 7, 1990 (Magazine), at 12. It is in the various
state legislatures, then, that one can expect increasingly to see the "moral dialogue" concerning
abortion which we hope our article will further. One caveat should be noted. State legislative
struggles could of course be precluded by abortion legislation at the federal level. Prochoice
advocates are attempting such a "preemptive strike" right now with their push for passage of
a Federal Freedom of Choice Act. H.R. 25, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); S. 25, 102d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1991).
20. See infra notes 120-23 and accompanying text.
21. Roe's discussion of viability in terms of the state's interest in protecting potential
life, 410 U.S. at 164, rather than in terms of the fetus's own right to life, in itself shows how
the unborn are marginalized under Roe.
22. 410 U.S. at 165.
23. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
24. Id. at 192.
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together effectively legalize abortion throughout all nine months of preg-
nancy.25 Rather than a compromise which values both fetal life and a woman's
liberty,2 Roe totally subordinates the fetus to the mother.27
If Tribe fails to keep his commitment to be impartial,2 one wonders
why. One answer is straightforward: one cannot have reasonably expected
25. See Glendon, supra note 12(A), at 55 (stating that "Roe leaves virtually no room
for protection even of viable fetuses from abortion"); McConnell, supra note 12(A), at 1198
n.40 (stating that since, under the Doe gloss, "the only genuine restraint on post-viability
abortions is medical, not legal," it is "somewhat misleading" to interpret Roe as having
actually treated viability as "an important concept").
26. Even the question of whether Roe properly should be referred to as a compromise
is controversial. Prochoice writers, as Tribe did, commonly do so. See, e.g., Gressman, supra
note 12(B), at 228; Frances Olsen, Unraveling Compromise, 103 HARv. L. REv. 105, 107
(1989). Prolife writers, such as ourselves, believe that such a characterization is not accurate
in any meaningful sense. As expressed by John T. Noonan, Jr., under Roe, during the first
two trimesters of pregnancy the "liberty to abort remain[s] in its essentials absolute." JoHN
T. NOONAN, JR., A PRIvATE CHOICE: ABORTION IN AMERICA IN TIm SEvErms 11 (1979). In
the third trimester, due to the broad health of the mother exception to the state's ability to
protect viable fetuses, any apparent limitation on abortion is "illusory." Id. at 12. Mensch
and Freeman, who not only profess neutrality on the issue of abortion rights, Mensch &
Freeman, supra note 19, at 931, but also succeed in being impartial, appear to find the prolife
characterization of Roe more accurate: "the assertion of Roe v. Wade as 'compromise' is
substantially belied by both the substantive positions of its critics and the politics which
followed the decision." Id. at 928 n.9.
27. Rather than helping women, however, we will show in Part II that Roe's complete
devaluation of the fetus results in the devaluation-of women as well.
28. Additional support for this conclusion is found in Professor McConnell's evaluation
of the sources relied upon by Tribe in writing Abortion. They are overwhelmingly prochoice
in orientation. See McConnell, supra note 12(A), at 1183-85. McConnell concludes "that Tribe
made almost no attempt to acquaint himself with the pro-life position as it has been articulated
by anti-abortion ethicists, scientists, historians, and constitutional lawyers." Id. at 1184.
Tribe's scholarship is also criticized by Professor Smolin, who says that Tribe acted
irresponsibly in Chapter 3 of Abortion, "Two Centuries of American Abortion Law." Smolin,
supra note 5, at 629. Smolin describes the "lively scholarly debate regarding the history of
American abortion," which has produced both an 'abortion rights history' and a 'pro-
life history."' Id. at 627-28. Tribe, though, "simply recounts one version of the abortion
rights history, announcing as accepted fact its most contentious conclusions ... without even
acknowledging differing scholarly views .... Id. at 629 (footnote omitted); see also McConnell,
supra note 12(A), at 1183 n.4.
We believe that Professor Smolin's criticism is warranted. Skepticism concerning Tribe's
impartiality is immediately aroused by his initial footnote to his American history discussion,
which states that a prochoice amicus curiae brief is "the point of departure for much of this
chapter." TRIBE, supra note 1, at 244 n.l. Professor McConnell argues that the use of such
partisan briefs "is a questionable scholarly practice. Briefs are a form of advocacy, not of
objective analysis." McConnell, supra note 12(A), at 1183 n.4.
A specific example of the inadequacy of Tribe's historical account concerns his treatment
of the early feminists. Tribe says merely that it is intriguing that abortion rights were not on
their agenda. TRInE, supra note 1, at 33. As convincingly demonstrated by Professor McConnell,
however:
the nineteenth century anti-abortion movement was strongly supported by the wom-
an's movement. For example, in their journal, The Revolution, Elizabeth Cady
Stanton and Susan B. Anthony frequently denounced the practice of abortion as
19921
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that Tribe, a long-standing "partisan of the pro-choice position," 29 could
have acted in any other way. One prochoice reviewer, after noting "the bias
that pervades the book," states that she would not even have purported "to
provide an objective description of the abortion controversy, knowing that
objectivity on that issue [was] not within [her] capabilities." 30 A more
disturbing explanation of Tribe's failure is provided by Professor Michael
McConnell, who suggests that Tribe's assertions in Abortion that he sought
"'common ground' may have been disingenuous from the start.3' According
to McConnell, to one who wants to defend Roe, it might "be good strategy
to be openly unfair to advocates of the pro-life position, because this could
serve to radicalize them, cause them to take a more extreme position, and
thus stave off the day when a moderate and humane reform of abortion law
is possible." '32
We do not know if Professor McConnell's unflattering evaluation of
Tribe's motives is accurate. We hope not. An alternative explanation is
suggested by Professor Mary Ann Glendon's characterization of Tribe as
someone who is experiencing an inner struggle concerning abortion, between
"the Larry Tribe who is compassionate towards the weak, vulnerable, and
disenfranchised [and thus is uncomfortable with his defense of a "right to
abort what he recognizes as a human person"], against the pioneering feminist
Larry Tribe."33 Such a struggle, in which the feminist Tribe for the moment
retains the ascendancy, could explain Tribe's expressed desire to honor prolife
values, but his inability to do so in fact.
Regardless of the explanation, Abortion does fail to achieve Tribe's truly
worthwhile stated objective:M to articulate a position on abortion which avoids
"child murder," "infanticide," and a "horrible crime," and editorialized that "[w]e
want prevention, not merely punishment. We must reach the root of the evil, and
destroy it."
McConnell, supra note 12(A), at 1188 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Maternity and Marriage,
1 THE REvoLUTIoN 4, 4 (July 8, 1869)). See id. at 1188 n.11; supra note 12 (Hentoff's
comments).
29. Marcus, supra note 12(B), at 1262.
30. Mahoney, supra note 5, at 1234. Several reviewers mention Tribe's prochoice parti-
sanship as an explanation for Abortion's prochoice bias. See, e.g., McConnell, supra note
12(A), at 1182-83; Torres, supra note 12(C), at 289-90.
31. McConnell, supra note 12(A), at 1200-02.
32. Id. at 1202. Support for McConnell's thesis is provided by Mensch and Freeman,
who believe that Tribe in Abortion "proclaim[s] and perpetuat[es] [the abortion issue's]
intractability ... in order to advance his implicit agenda in favor of the pro-choice status quo
exemplified by Roe v. Wade." Mensch & Freeman, supra note 19, at 927-28.
33. Glendon, supra note 12(A), at 58.
34. Professor McConnell laments Tribe's failure. Tribe, "[w]ith his long-term commit-
ment to abortion rights ... [was] in a unique position . .. to introduce his audience to the
pro-life position, to show that ... [it] is not (as he says many pro-choice advocates assume)
'prejudiced, superstitious, [and] backward."' McConnell, supra note 12(A), at 1181-82 (quoting
TRME, supra note 1, at 239). Similarly, "if pro-life advocates [had] heard Professor Laurence
Tribe, of all people, taking their ethical, scientific, and legal claims seriously, they might also
be inclined to listen with a more sympathetic ear to Tribe's description of the other side of
the tragedy of abortion." Id. at 1182.
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treating either the woman or the fetus as a "ghost." Tribe's goal of taking
both fetal life and women seriously is, however, achievable. Our contention
is that the only way to do so, rather than by abortion on demand as
sanctioned by Roe and defended by Tribe, is through a comprehensive prolife
approach. While there are other integral elements, the core of such an
approach is, regardless of the circumstances which lead a woman to seek an
abortion, to provide from conception the same protection for the lives of
preborn humans that is provided to humans postbirth. This article's principal
purpose is to explain and defend our position. Doing so will allow us not
only further to demonstrate the flaws in Tribe's view, but also to critique
various aspects of other reviews of Abortion.
I. TAKIG FETAL LIFE SERIOUSLY
A. Motives
One would think that it would hardly be necessary to defend the prop-
osition that a prolife perspective involves taking fetal life seriously. A "uni-
fying theme" of Abortion, however, is Professor Tribe's effort to impugn
the motives of the prolife movement.35 On the book's first page, Tribe
wonders if there are ways of considering the abortion issue "that face the
realities of sex and power that underlie the struggle."3 6 Abortion reflects
Tribe's attempt to expose these "realities." His conclusion? "Whether in the
name of traditional sex roles or in the name of traditional sexual morality
... opposition to women's having the right to choose to end a pregnancy is
more about the control of women than about the sanctity of life .... -37
From this premise, Tribe argues that prolife advocates should:
conclude that the objection to abortion rights ought to yield, as a
matter of morality, to the claim of the woman to her liberty and
equality. To conscript a woman to save a life might be one thing.
To conscript her to save a way of life, one in which she is relegated
to a second-class role, is another thing entirely.38.
Professor Tribe's emphasis on attacking prolife motives39 is inconsis-
tent with his stated goal of not treating the fetus as a "ghost." Imple-
35. Gutmann, supra note 12(B), at 44. Ms. Gutmann, a prochoice reviewer, finds this
characteristic to be the "most troubling aspect" of Tribe's book. Id. McConnell, a prolife
reviewer, says that it is "the most unattractive part of [Tribe's] argument." McConnell, supra
note 12(A), at 1188-89.
36. TRmE, supra note 1, at 3.
37. Id. at 238, 241.
38. Id. at 241.
39. In the last paragraph of Abortion, Tribe suggests that the prochoice movement also
may not have been totally honest about its motives. Id. at 242. The only explanation Tribe
offers is the description a few pages before of the movement as consisting disproportionately
of the "educated eliteH," who are often contemptuous of prolifers and who, in addition to
abortion rights, "tend to favor a cluster of positions including ... more vigorous enforcement
19921
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menting that goal would instead have required concentration upon the
question of whether the fetuses killed by abortions are in fact persons.
If they are, the relevance of Tribe's charge is questionable. As Professor
David Smolin argues
Surely purity of motivation is not required for social action, so
long as the end sought is proper. Nobody has completely pure
motivations, even for laudable conduct.... If we discovered that
enforcement of infanticide laws was primarily motivated by a
desire to maintain traditional gender or parenting roles, rather
than "true" concern for neonatal life, would we urge abolition
of such laws?
40
We believe that Professor Smolin's point regarding motives is valid.
Consequently, since we will establish that abortion should be equated
with infanticide, it might seem superfluous for us to address the merits
of Professor Tribe's attack upon prolife motivations. Tribe, however,
directly contradicts our contention that a comprehensive prolife approach
is the only way to take both fetal life and women seriously. While we
argue that such an approach values fetal life, Tribe says that the purported
solicitude for fetal life is a smoke screen for a hidden objective. While
we argue that a prolife approach values women, Tribe says that the prolife
movement's true goal is their subjugation. It is, therefore, imperative to
demonstrate that Tribe's thesis cannot be substantiated.
A simple place to begin is to say that Tribe has not accurately
described our motives. Such a flat assertion, however, might be rejected
as merely self-serving. We therefore will examine Tribe's attack in some
detail to show that, as a general critique4' of the motives underlying the
of laws protecting racial minorities, unrestricted speech and artistic expression, tighter control
of police brutality, opposition to the death penalty, stronger environmental protection, stricter
gun control, gay rights, and so forth." Id. at 239-240. This characterization of prochoicers,
which can be viewed only as an aside when weighed against the book's persistent impugning
of prolife motives, nonetheless earns criticism for Tribe from his prochoice reviewers. Professor
Braucher says that "Tribe seems to think people support abortion rights to be among the
liberal chic." Braucher, supra note 12(B), at 606. Professor Mary Dunlap characterizes Tribe's
description as "condescending, undocumented and insulting." Dunlap, supra note 12(B), at
62. Her conclusion? "[B]eware of undocumented and expedient claims of education-based
elitism made by Harvard law professors, and, especially, beware such claims when made by
candidates for the United States Supreme Court who may be seeking to balance their 'resumes'
on the acid issue of abortion choice." Id. at 62-63 (at another point, id. at 52, 53, Dunlap
accuses Tribe of attempting, through compliments to various Justices, "to ingratiate himself
with ... members of a bench ... on which he is often mentioned as the likeliest first nominee
of a liberal President .... ).
40. Smolin, supra note 5, at 627.
41. Tribe himself acknowledges that there are some prolifers whose "opposition to letting
women choose [abortion] ... reflect[s] not a sexist view of a woman's 'place' but a humane
concern for the fetus as an unborn baby, as a helpless member of the human family but a
family member nonetheless." TRIBE, supra note I, at 211. To Tribe, though, even a genuine
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prolife movement, it is unpersuasive. 42
If the true objective of the prolife movement is to perpetuate the
subjugation of women, one initially wonders at Tribe's failure to explain
the fact that "women are significantly more prolife than men." 43 It would
concern for the fetus would not warrant opposition to abortion.
Not even someone who regards every abortion as wrong is likely to think it just
doesn't matter whether children whose mothers do not want them are born....
The compassionate impulse that leads everyone to agree that the plight of such
unwanted children does matter no doubt plays an important part in the decisions of
many women not to have children, to use contraception, and, if they have become
pregnant, reluctantly to choose abortion.
Id.
The view that compassion for unwanted children requires a woman's license to abort is
a long-standing staple of the prochoice movement. See, e.g., Allen, supra note 12(B), at 202;
Mensch & Freeman, supra note 19, at 1106; infra notes 170-73 and accompanying text. The
argument is deeply flawed. First, it inaccurately presupposes that every unwanted preborn baby
will be unwanted once born. Tribe himself acknowledges that many women decide not to give
up babies who, prebirth, were unwanted. TtiE, supra note 1, at 104, 211. Second, even
assuming that a preborn baby's unwantedness will continue after birth, it is at best incongruous
to say that one demonstrates compassion for an unwanted child by allowing his/her very
"unwantedness" to serve as the justification for his/her death through abortion. Recall that
Tribe at this point of his argument is conceding that the fetus is "an unborn baby ... a
helpless member of the human family but a family member nonetheless." Id. at 211. There
can be no more subjective standard by which to judge the value of a human being than
whether that person is wanted by those around him/her. Tribe's embrace of this standard for
preborn humans reveals the extent to which they are "ghosts" under his approach.
42. We do not contend that there are no prolifers who are motivated by a desire to
subjugate women. We agree with Professor McConnell "that some opposition to abortion may
stem from an antipathy to the participation of women in economic and public life outside
their traditional roles." McConnell, supra note 12(A), at 1192. He notes as well, however,
that "some support for abortion rights stems from male sexual adventurism and some from
a racist desire to control the population of minorities and welfare recipients." Id. Mary Ann
Glendon adds to the list of silent prochoice motives the pecuniary interests of "the profit-
making abortion industry." Glendon, supra note 12(A), at 57. Her conclusion, however:
is that searches for hidden reasons are not very useful. Any coalitions as diverse as
the prolife and prochoice movements will have some members who are animated by
base and unworthy motives. After many years of watching the fray, I see no reason
not to accept the accounts given by both sides as substantially accurate descriptions
of what is most important to most of their supporters.
Id. at 58.
43. Glendon, supra note 12(A), at 57; see also McConnell, supra note 12(A), at 1190.
Based on the strength of female prolife support, Daniel Callahan, a prominent prochoice
advocate, rejects as an "old stereotype" Tribe's argument "that resistance to legal abortion
is little more than an exercise of male power over women." Callahan, supra note 12(B), at
13. The recent formation of the National Women's Coalition for Life corroborates Callahan's
view. Founding members include "Feminists for Life, the Professional Women's Network,
Concerned Women for America, Women Affirming Life, the International Black Women's
Network, the National Council of Catholic Women, and Women for Women." Press Release,
National Women's Coalition for Life (April 3, 1992). The coalition's various groups together
have 1.5 million members. Id. The coalition rejects rhetoric which equates "women's rights
with abortion 'rights."' Id. Rather, it maintains that "[r]eal rights for women come from 'a
societal commitment to the unique roles women are living out, including motherhood.' Women's
rights are not promoted when women 'stand idly by while our government and society urge[]
us to treat unborn children as [disposable] property."' Id.
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seem odd on its face for women to be fighting to keep themselves in "a
second-class role." 44 One explanation, which Tribe attributes to some pro-
choicers, is "a doctrine of 'false consciousness' that permits them to dismiss
pro-life women in particular as benighted victims of social conditioning that
prevents their views from authentically reflecting their own genuine needs
and deepest beliefs." 45 Tribe says that he condemns such a contemptuous
attitude. 46 If so, it is difficult to explain Tribe's own apparent dismissal of
prolife women.
How then does Tribe attempt to show the hidden sexist motives of the
prolife movement? He does so through an involved extrapolation from the
fact that "people who generally oppose abortion would nonetheless permit
it in cases of rape and incest." ' 47 This exception, which "suggests that
antiabortion sentiment is not entirely rooted in a belief that abortion
constitutes the killing of an innocent human being, ' 48 is most likely explained
''49by the "nonconsensual nature of the sex that led to [the] pregnancy....
Why then, Tribe wonders, do prolifers not recognize a similar exception
when pregnancy results "from the failure of a conscientiously used, ordi-
narily effective means of birth control?" 0 Does not the absence of such an
exception:
suggest that such opponents of abortion come to their views about
the immorality of abortion not in response to the voluntary nature
of the woman's pregnancy but in response to the voluntary nature
of the sexual activity in which she has engaged? And does this not
44. TIaBE, supra note 1, at 241.
45. Id. at 239. Professor Celeste Condit evinces a different form of contempt for prolife
women. She describes the abortion controversy as actually pitting "the liberty of wage-laboring
women ... against the economic interests of all those groups who would bind these women
as the producers of 'potential human life."' Condit, supra note 12(B), at 905. Such "groups
include 'traditional women' for whom laws premised upon 'women as mothers' will favor
their interests, whereas laws premised on 'women as persons with choices' will not as directly
favor their interests." Id. at 905 n.6. It is obvious that Professor Condit's views are premised
in the stereotype that only prochoice women are "wage-laboring," whereas prolife women are
"traditional," conjuring up the image of the happy homemaker. Condit's presuppositions are
inaccurate. Consider, for example, the statement of Jean French, who, when a nurse, in 1984
co-founded (together with "an architect, an attorney, and a graduate student in business")
the Professional Women's Network, Human Life Advocates: 'People automatically assume
that if you're an educated, thinking woman with tolerant values, that you're pro-choice and
this is simply not the case.' . . . 'There are thousands of professional women out there who
are pro-life."' Diane Krstulovich, Disposing of Pro-Life Stereotypes, JOURNAL MONTAGE, Dec.
11, 1991, at 47, 56.
46. See TRIBE, supra note 1, at 239-40. Professors Mensch and Freeman note that such
an evaluation of prolife women "seems increasingly facile and outmoded." Mensch & Freeman,
supra note 19, at 936 n.22. They cite a number of sources which recognize that even feminist
women "might in good faith ... support a pro-life position .... Id. at 934 n.19.
47. TRIBE, supra note 1, at 232.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 233.
50. Id. at 132.
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in turn suggest that such antiabortion views are driven less by the
innocence of the fetus (which does not turn on how or why the sex
occurred or the pregnancy began) than by the supposed "guilt" of
the woman?
5'
Tribe believes so: such prolifers' "aversion to abortion rights would seem
to reflect a deeply held sexual morality, in which pregnancy and childbirth




52. Id. at 234. Tribe bolsters his conclusion by the frequent assertion that some prolifers
oppose "sex education and the availability of birth control," id., because of their belief that
such practices condone "premarital or nonprocreative or irresponsible sexuality, which they
regard as immoral." Id. at 213. According to Tribe, "[i]f one truly believes that abortion is
murder, preventing it through sex education is surely a lesser of two evils." Id. To Tribe,
such prolifers expose their position as one "in which sexual morality is primary, with any
claim of a fetus's right to life taking a very distant backseat." Id. at 234.
Before responding specifically to Tribe's argument, it is important to note that not all of
those prolifers who do oppose contraception do so for reasons grounded in beliefs concerning
sexual morality. Pat Goodson, for example, notes that "contraceptives are unacceptable to
many prolifers who see an undesirable connection between abortion and contraception. The
acceptance of contraception creates a climate, a 'contraceptive mentality,' in which the rejection
of an unwanted pregnancy becomes a convenient solution.... On a practical level abortion
is a 'fall-safe' contraceptive." Goodson, supra note 5, at 78 n.69. It is also significant that
the quoted passages from Abortion show that Tribe himself recognizes that not all prolifers
oppose sex education and birth control. The National Right-to-Life Committee, for example,
takes no position on contraception and does not involve itself in family planning issues unless
abortion is included as a family planning method. To many prolifers, contraception differs
fundamentally from abortion. True contraceptive methods (that is, those that are not aborti-
facients) prevent a human being from coming into existence, whereas abortion destroys a
human being-already in existence. See infra notes 99-101 and accompanying text. In view of
many prolifers' approval of contraception, one cannot help wondering why Tribe so emphasizes
the disapproval of some. After all, there is very little, if any, indication that prolifers who do
not believe in contraception are interested in outlawing contraceptive use by others. See, e.g.,
DR. & MRS. J.C. Wn.Ia¢, ABORTION: QuasnoNs AND ANswERs 234 (1990). Tribe, though,
raises the specter of prolife opposition to contraception, perhaps to deter people from
reevaluating their support of abortion-Tribe's (unconvincing) message being that opposition
to abortion necessarily entails opposition to contraception.
Regardless of Tribe's motives, his argument that those prolifers who on moral grounds
oppose a "progressive sex education policy" are subordinating the value of fetal life to their
views concerning sexual immorality, TRIE, supra note 1, at 213, is not persuasive. Tribe's
position presupposes that sex education and birth control invariably lead to a reduction in
unwanted pregnancies and, hence, fewer abortions. While Tribe cites Swedish experience to
support this assumption, id. at 212, the correlation that he posits has not been proven. In
June 1991, for example, the Washington Post reported a "dramatic" increase in teenage
pregnancy rates in Alexandria, Virginia, from 1985 to 1989. Pierre Thomas, Teenage Pregnancy
Rate Increasing Steadily in Area; AIDS Threat Having Little Effect on Figures, WAsH. POST,
June 27, 1991, at CI. If Tribe's thesis is accurate, one would suppose that the way to combat
the problem would be sex education and an increased availability of birth control. Not so. As
revealed by an editorial in the Richmond Times-Dispatch, the Alexandria public schools
"provided the working model for development of ... [Virginia's] compulsory FLE [Family
Life Education] program. Alexandria has had comprehensive sex education in its schools for
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It is curious that Professor Tribe uses the rape exception to level a
general charge of sexism against the prolife movement. First, as he recognizes
in a brief allusion, 3 some prolifers do not acknowledge a rape exception.5 4
Second, one would have thought that Tribe, instead of attacking their
integrity," would have commended those prolifers who do accept the rape
exception for not reducing raped women "to ghostly anonymity."
's6
In any event, Tribe's thesis that the rape exception shows that prolifers
are really motivated by a desire to punish guilty women for consensual sex
is implausible on its face. Consider the fact that consensual sex within
marriage is morally blameless. Consequently, if as Tribe asserts, a woman's
10 years now. And that's not all. It even has school-based birth control clinics." Teen
Pregnancy Promotion?, RcH. TMEs-DISPATCH, Aug. 13, 1991, at A14. The writer concludes
that the fact that Alexandria's teen pregnancy rate subsequently went "through the roof"
provides strong "circumstantial evidence" establishing "a cause-and-effect relationship between
free-and-easy sex-ed in schools and [an] escalating teen pregnancy rate." Id.
53. TRmE, supra note 1, at 114.
54. We include ourselves in this group. See infra notes 178-88 and accompanying text.
Interestingly, Tribe, who premises so much of his attack on prolife motives upon the rape
exception, nowhere mentions the well-known fact that rape pregnancy abortions are very
uncommon. Dr. and Mrs. Willke estimate that for the entire country the figure is "somewhere
between 30 and 500 ... per year, with a more likely figure between 50 and 100." W.LKE,
supra note 52, at 153. Since well over one million abortions occur in the United States each
year for reasons other than rape, it is somewhat puzzling that Tribe accords the rape exception
so much significance, especially when it can be explained by reasons more plausible than those
offered by Tribe. See infra notes 55-60 and accompanying text.
55. Amy Gutmann says that "[t]his is a counterproductive argument, if the goal is
common ground." Gutmann, supra note 12(B), at 44. Tribe's approach to the rape exception,
however, is consistent with his general tack throughout the book: "to persuade the pro-life
reader that it is unprincipled to take anything but the most absolute position." McConnell,
supra note 12(A), at 1193. According to Mensch and Freeman, "the strategy of [Abortion] is
to keep the two sides as far apart as possible, especially emphasizing the pro-life position as
necessarily incapable of compromise, so as to leave the reader who is unwilling to criminalize
all or nearly all abortions with no choice but to reaffirm Roe v. Wade." Mensch & Freeman,
supra note 19, at 927 n.8. See also supra note 32 and accompanying text.
There is other evidence of how Abortion does not advance the search for "common
ground." Prochoicer Daniel Callahan criticizes Tribe's "scornful [attitude toward] proposed
American laws that would mandate waiting periods for women who want abortions, require
parental notification for minors, and place restrictions on government financing of abortion
for indigent women." Callahan, supra note 12(B), at 1; see TRmE, supra note 1, at 199-204,
206-07. To Callahan, Tribe's rejection of these proposed compromises "is unfortunate,
particularly since he offers nothing to take their place." Callahan, supra note 12(B), at 13.
56. Tribe, in the first few paragraphs of Abortion, states that "[r]ape is among the most
profound denials of liberty, and compelling a woman to bear a rapist's child is an assault on
her humanity." TRIBE, supra note 1, at 3. He thus plainly implies that, if women are to be
valued, abortion must be allowed in cases of rape. Yet, Tribe impugns the motives of prolifers
who recognize a rape exception. Tribe's approach obviously is a "no win" proposition for
the prolifer. It also fits Professor Smolin's description "of a common tactic of pro-abortion
rights polemicists. Where pro-lifers are lenient, or grant exceptions, the suggestion is made
that their proposals are irrational, inconsistent, or reflect ulterior motives. Where pro-lifers
are strict, however, the accusation is made that they are inhumane, too harsh toward women,
or impractical." Smolin, supra note 5, at 648. In any event, we will argue later in this article
that the rape exception is not in fact in the best interest of rape victims. See infra note 188.
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moral guilt or innocence in having sex were the chief prolife criterion for
determining if an abortion should be allowed, one would expect prolifers
also to support abortions for married women whose unwanted pregnancies
resulted from sex with their husbands. Tribe's argument, though, apparently
presupposes unmarried sexual partners. His contention is that the way to
explain the fact that some prolifers recognize a rape exception, while failing
to recognize an exception for failed birth control, is that forced continuation
of the pregnancy in the latter case is a punitive "sentence" for engaging in
an immoral act. There is a much more plausible explanation. Because it is
known that no birth control is 100 percent effective, 7 when a couple has
consensual sex, the partners know that there is some risk of pregnancy. In
an exercise of autonomy, both partners knowingly subject themselves to
this risk and thus are responsible for the potential consequences of freely
chosen action. This imposition of responsibility is morally justifiable re-
gardless of one's views of the morality of consensual sex itself.58 Tribe's
description of the refusal to allow abortion as "punishment" is therefore
not persuasive. 9
What then of the rape exception? Rape vidtims have not exercised their
autonomy at the risk of becoming pregnant. It is this absence of volitional
risk-taking that partially explains some prolifers' willingness to relieve the
victim from any responsibility to the unborn child. 60 As we will explain
later,61 we do not recognize the rape exception. Still, as an explanation for
why some prolifers do, we find a distinction between rape and failed birth
control premised in comparative moral responsibility for the consequences
of one's acts more compelling than Tribe's distinction premised in compar-
ative moral blameworthiness of the underlying conduct.
One's moral accountability for the reasonably foreseeable consequences
of one's conduct reveals the inaptness of Judith Thomson's well-known
57. See TamE, supra note 1, at 214.
58. A major flaw in Tribe's theory is its presupposition that the prolife movement is a
monolithic entity with one view of sexual morality. This assumption ignores reality. As an
indication of the fact that people with quite different worldviews have united to seek legal
protection for the preborn, consider that the prolife movement includes such groups as (1)
Atheists for Life; (2) Feminists for Life; (3) Libertarians for Life; (4) the Pro-Life Alliance
of Gays and Lesbians; and (5) Wiccans Against Abortion.
59. See Smolin, supra note 5, at 660 n.163 ("[e]ven those who believe that sexual
intercourse outside of marriage is immoral, do not necessarily view pregnancy as 'punishment,'
but rather as 'responsibility:' pregnancy after all can follow either the moral act of marital
intercourse or the immoral act of fornication.").
60. Tribe mentions another factor-the compassion these prolifers feel "for the woman;
they don't think she should have to live through having her rapist's child develop within her."
TRmE, supra note 1, at 233. In this quote, Tribe ignores the fact that the child is not solely
the "rapist's"; he/she is also the woman's child. There is substantial evidence that the additional
trauma associated with killing her own child is not helpful to a woman attempting to deal
with the trauma of rape. See infra note 188. Still, it is undeniable that "[m]any people who
otherwise oppose abortion feel that the case of rape is different...." ScHWARZ, supra note
5, at 147; see id. at 147-49 for a statement of reasons.
61. See infra notes 178-88 and accompanying text.
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unconscious violinist hypothetical, which Tribe relies upon as part of his
defense of the freedom to abort all unwanted pregnancies, not just preg-
nancies resulting from nonconsensual sex. In this hypothetical, each of us
is asked "to imagine waking up in the morning attached to a famous and
accomplished violinist. The violinist has a kidney disorder and, unbeknownst
to you, he has been attached to your circulatory system while you were
asleep. If he were detached, he could not survive." 62 Tribe states that "just
about everybody" would agree that no law could justly compel you to
remain attached, even though the "inevitable result" of detachment would
be the violinist's death.
6 3
While Thomson's scenario is an argument for abortion in the case of
rape, Thomson herself recognizes difficulties with its persuasiveness when
"pregnancy result[s] from a voluntary act," including cases where birth
control was used but failed.64 Although Tribe at one point appears ready
to acknowledge this distinction between rape and failed birth control, 5
ultimately he rejects it and persists in his critique of the prolife movement
as sexist. Why? Because "however voluntary the sex may have been, the
woman was, of course, not the sole participant. Yet a ban on abortion
imposes truly burdensome duties only on women. Such a ban thus places
women, by accident of their biology, in a permanently and irrevocably
subordinate position to men."6'
Because women alone bear the physiological consequences of pregnancy,
it cannot be denied that they have more at stake in the decision to have
sexual intercourse. A woman, however, knows this at the time she chooses
to have sex. She thus knowifigly assumes a greater risk of the burdens of
any resulting pregnancy. Moreover, freely allowing abortions does not
equalize matters between women and men because only women can have
abortions. 67 A major weakness in Abortion is Tribe's failure to address the
62. TRIBE, supra note 1, at 129 (citing Judith J. Thomson, A Defense of Abortion, 1
J. Prm. & PuB. AFn. 47 (1971)).
63. Id. at 130.
64. Thomson, supra note 62, at 58-59. Prochoicer Amy Gutmann speaks more strongly:
"The violinist example supports only the prohibition against imposing the virtue of saving a
life on a person who is not at all responsible for bringing that life into being." Gutmann,
supra note 12(B), at 44. While we agree with Gutmann that the violinist hypothetical does not
support abortion where pregnancy results from consensual sex, we will demonstrate in Part II
that neither does it support abortion where the sex was nonconsensual. The reason is that
prohibiting abortion is not to force a woman to "save" a life, but rather is to prevent her
from killing. See infra notes 178-88 and accompanying text.
65. TRmE, supra note 1, at 131-32. After struggling with whether the distinction should
matter, Tribe states that "if one assumes a pregnancy that did not result from any sort of
coercion, . . . perhaps the imposition of continued pregnancy on the woman may not be
unjust." Id. at 132.
66. Id.
67. According to Professor Smolin:
women will never be equally autonomous, because women will always pay a higher
price for their autonomy. Only women have to kill in order to attain a male-like
degree of autonomy. Only women have to experience the pain and physical intrusion
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mounting evidence of the physical and psychological harm inflicted upon
women by abortion." The fact is that women and men are biologically
different beings and therefore it is impossible to equalize sexual intercourse
between them. Tribe assumes that the male experience of presumed irre-
sponsibility is the model to which women should aspire. 69 We urge instead
that both parties be held morally accountable.
For the woman, moral accountability means accepting the fact that once
she is pregnant she already is a mother;70 a preborn baby exists and there
is a duty not to kill him/her. Upon birth, the mother owes her child
fulfillment of all parental duties until her parental responsibilities are legally
terminated, as by giving the child up for adoption. Similarly, a man, upon
his sexual partner's pregnancy, must accept the fact that he already is a
father. He therefore has a duty not to seek his child's death by encouraging
or insisting upon an abortion. Rather, he must provide medical care to the
mother during pregnancy and delivery. After birth, the father, like the
mother, owes his child fulfillment of all parental duties until legal termi-
nation of his parental responsibilities.7' A comprehensive prolife approach
should include efforts to establish more effective ways for holding men to
these duties.72
of abortion to achieve autonomy. Only women have to experience the act of the
fetus being torn from her body, or dying within her body, to achieve autonomy.
Smolin, supra note 5, at 639. See infra notes 206-09 and accompanying text.
68. See infra notes 204-09 and accompanying text.
69. See infra notes 197-99 and accompanying text for a discussion of the sexism inherent
in this assumption.
70. See infra note 147.
71. The concept of parental duties is a neglected element of the abortion debate, which
has focused instead on the relative rights of the woman and of the fetus. It helps to ask not
when does the fetus have rights, but when do parental duties attach. Prolifers argue that
parental duties depend upon the status of the being to whom the duties are owed. Since a
fetus from conception is a human being and an offspring of the parents, he/she is a "child"
to whom the parents owe a duty to care and provide. This perspective resolves Tribe's "clash
of absolutes":
There is no conflict of rights between mother (or father) and child because parents
have an obligation to care for their children and, therefore, children have a right to
that care .... Even the state acknowledges this is true, for the state compels parents
to support their children. If children are children before as well as after birth, the
parents have the obligation to care for them, also.
125 CONG. REc. 33,995 (1979) (statement of Doris Gordon, founder of Libertarians for Life).
72. Fully to discuss the specifics of how to hold men more accountable is beyond the
scope of this article. Ensuring male accountability will not be easy. Professor Glendon, for
example, writes of the "national scandal" in the United States concerning "child support (for
children born inside or outside of legal marriage).... The problems of ascertaining paternity
of children born outside wedlock, of the low amounts of support awarded, of the difficulty
in collecting and enforcing child support awards are well known and of long standing." MARY
ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DrVORCE IN WasrmuR LAw 57 (1987). Glendon, however, also
offers hope by contrasting the situation in several European countries:
countries like Denmark, Norway, and Sweden have long had mandatory paternity
actions that do in fact result in determining paternity for nearly all children born
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Professor Tribe, rather than recognizing the desirability of increasing
male responsibility in the context of a sexual partner's pregnancy, instead
focuses upon society's failure in another context to impose upon men "the
kind of sacrifice some would have 'us impose on the pregnant woman in
the name of the fetus. '73 Tribe posits a daughter in need of a liver transplant
and only her father's liver tissue is compatible with hers. Tribe points out
that the law has never required a father to make such a sacrifice74 and
implies that this proves the sexist motivation of the prolife movement. 5
The liver transplant hypothetical provides no support for Tribe's charge
of sexism. First, Tribe fails to note that the law does not force mothers to
be organ donors to their children either. Second, the liver transplant scenario
is distinguishable from an unwanted pregnancy. The father in that hypo-
thetical had nothing to do with causing his daughter's ailment. With
pregnancy, however, the woman by having sex was a participant in causing
both the fetus's existence and the dependent condition for which the fetus
needs his/her mother. Moreover, it is inaccurate to view the two situations
as each raising the issue of whether one should be forced to rescue another
from death. 76 The daughter who needs a liver transplant is in the natural
process of dying. Not coming to her aid would be to allow her to die. The
father's intervention could thus accurately be characterized as a rescue which
saves his daughter's life. In pregnancy, the fetus, in its natural prebirth
environment, continues to develop and grow in a process naturally leading
to birth. A decision to abort is thus a decision to kill rather than a decision
to allow another to die.77 Consequently, being required not to abort is not
like being required to rescue, 7s since the event from which the mother would
to unmarried mothers. Several countries now use standard formulas and tables for
calculating realistic amounts of child support and have extremely efficient collection
mechanisms, including direct deduction of child support from the noncustodial
parent's wages. Many countries, in addition, have assumed the risk of noncollection
of child support by paying a guaranteed public maintenance allowance to the support
creditors while the state attempts to collect what is owing from the support debtor.
Id. For a discussion of innovative methods being used in the United States in an attempt "to
beef up [child support] collections," see Steven Waldman, Deadbeat Dads, NEWSWEEK, May
4, 1992, at 46, 49.
73. TRiBE, supra note 1, at 133.
74. Tribe is referring to the Good Samaritan doctrine, under which "there is no general
duty to give of yourself to rescue another." Id. at 130.
75. Id. at 133, 210.
76. As Professor Jean Braucher, a prochoice reviewer, notes, the Good Samaritan
doctrine distinguishes "between acts and omissions. To use the no-duty-to-help doctrine, having
an abortion has to be characterized as an omission, a refusal to help, rather than as an act
causing harm." Braucher, supra note 12(B), at 614. This and other difficulties in applying the
doctrine lead Braucher to characterize it as "a slender reed on which to hang abortion rights."
Id. at 613. She also criticizes "the radical individualism involved in applying [the] doctrine in
the abortion context [as] not consistent with the way in which many women make the moral
decision to have an abortion." Id.; see infra notes 169-70 and accompanying text.
77. See Smolin, supra note 5, at 643.,
78. Tribe appears to acknowledge this distinction by noting that "many ... feel that
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be saving the fetus is her own act of aggression against the fetus.
B. Fetal Personhood
As Professor McConnell has noted, one of the most disturbing aspects
of Roe was its suggestion, through the statement that the Court 'need not
resolve the difficult question of when life begins,'. . . that the question of
human life was irrelevant to the decision."17 9 To many people a finding of
fetal personhood 0 presumably would significantly affect their evaluation of
the circumstances under which abortion should be allowed. To Professor
Tribe's credit, he at least discusses the possibility that protecting fetal
personhood might be a sufficiently strong governmental interest to overcome
the woman's right to abort."' Tribe's conclusion, however, contrasts starkly
with his stated intention not to treat fetuses as "ghosts": even if fetuses
are persons, a woman's right to abortion supersedes the fetus's right to
life.8 2 His reasoning is the identical argument which he makes to support
the charge of sexism against the prolife movement: the law does not force
a man to rescue his dying child and thus a woman should not be forced to
rescue the fetus by being denied an abortion. 3 We have already shown the
inaptness of this analogy."4
There is even more compelling evidence of the "ghostliness" of fetal
life under Tribe's analysis. Tribe asserts that even if it were possible to
remove a fetus (regardless of whether the fetus at that particular moment
was a person) from the mother without destroying him/her, the mother still
might have the right to kill the child.8 5 Tribe's view is astonishing because
he at several points carefully distinguishes between "the right not to remain
the very act of abortion, given current technology, represents a decision to kill and not simply
a refusal to help or an unwillingness to sacrifice." TRnE, supra note 1, at 210. This contrasts
with what Tribe describes as Judith Thomson's position: "A woman denied the right to decide
whether or not to end a pregnancy is not merely being asked to refrain from killing another
person but being asked :o make an affirmative sacrifice, and a profound one at that, in order
to save that person." Id. at 130.
79. McConnell, supra note 12(A), at 1198. McConnell also points out that the Roe
Court's withdrawal of "protection from fetal life appears to [have] resolve[d] the question"
after all. Id. at 1185. By deciding "without admitting it," the Court did not have "to support
its decision with reasons." Id. at 1198.
80. We use the term "personhood" not in reference to a technical constitutional status,
but to the moral concept of an individual human being.
81. TmE, supra note 1, at 113-38. It should be noted, though, that Tribe, by framing
the issue in this way, already has significantly devalued the fetus. He begins with a woman's
right to abort and only then asks whether that right can be curtailed to protect the fetus. A
more solicitous approach to the fetus would have been to consider his/her right to life in the
evaluation of whether a woman should have a right to abort in the first place. For Tribe's
defense of his approach, in terms of constitutional principles (rather than principles of morality),
see id. at 96-98.
82. Id. at 129-35.
83. Id.
84. See supra notes 73-78 and accompanying text.
85. TitiE, supra note 1, at 223-25.
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pregnant" and the "right to destroy one's fetus. '8 6 Tribe plainly states that
it is the former right, not the latter, which is protected by Roe.87 Thus,
when technology makes it "possible for a woman to decide to terminate
her pregnancy but . . . save the life of the fetus," 88 one would think that
Tribe, who wants to give "voice to the human reality" of the fetus, 9 would
firmly support the fetus's right to live. Not so. For Tribe, killing the fetus
might be justified by a woman's right to control her genetic material9° and
by an aversion to reliance upon a technology which offers a woman
"equality only by rendering her womanhood inconsequential and margin-
alizing her distinctiveness as a woman.'' 9
In view of Tribe's refusal to defend fetal life even if the fetus is a
person, one wonders why he even discusses the issue of whether the fetus
is in fact a person. Tribe does, however, devote considerable attention to
this issue. He begins92 by pointing out how both prolifers and prochoicers
look to science to support their respective arguments for and against separate
fetal personhood. 93 While Tribe initially seems persuaded by Charles Gard-
ner's argument that the fertilized ovum is not a separate person-based on
Gardner's contention that there is not "one and only one 'path' for the
fertilized egg to travel on its way to full gestation" 94-Tribe concludes that
Gardner's
86. E.g., id. at 98. Professor Mary Dunlap, a prochoice reviewer, labels Tribe's attempt
to distinguish these two rights "one of the strangest developments in his book." Dunlap,
supra note 12(B), at 57. It is a "line that cannot yet be medically and technologically drawn
... [and thus] resolves nothing in the current abortion dilemma." Id. To Dunlap, Tribe's
"fanciful discussion ... seems ... like legalism taken to its most absurd height, and escapism
taken to a new length." Id. at 57 n.75.
87. TRIBE, supra note 1, at 99, 114-15.
88. Id. at 98.
89. Id. at 6.
90. Id. at 223-25; see id. at 230. Tribe's reference to the preborn as "genetic material"
is stark evidence of the extent to which he marginalizes their value.
91. Id. at 224-25; see id. at 230. It is interesting to note that Judith Thomson does not
support a woman's "right to secure the death of the unborn child." Thomson, supra note 62,
at 66. Referring to her violinist hypothetical, she says that: "I have argued that you are not
morally required to spend nine months in bed, sustaining the life of that violinist; but to say
this is by no means to say that if, when you unplug yourself, there is a miracle and he
survives, you then have a right to turn around and slit his throat." Id.
92. In a prologue to his discussion, Tribe rejects the argument that the question of when
"someone's life begins is inherently a religious one" and thus inappropriat.e for governmental
consideration: "[Als a matter of constitutional law, a question such as this, having an
irreducibly moral dimension, cannot properly be kept out of the political realm merely because
many religions and organized religious groups inevitably take strong positions on it." TRIBE,
supra note I, at 116; see Carter, supra note 12(C), at 2757 n.27. For an argument that there
are faith-based constraints on a Christian's freedom to seek laws which implement faith-based
precepts, see Samuel W. Calhoun, Conviction Without Imposition: A Response to Professor
Greenawalt, 9 J.L. & RELIGION (forthcoming 1992).
93. TRIE, supra note 1, at 116-17.
94. Id. at 117-19 (citing Charles A. Gardner, Is an Embryo a Person?, NATION, Nov.
13, 1989).
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"disproof" of separate embryonic personhood ... cannot succeed
completely. It does not prove that the fetus is less a human being
than any of us. The particular and distinctive person you might
become, even today, is 'not yet there' either .... [I]t hardly follows
that you are not now a human being-a separate person.95
Tribe's ultimate position is that "[c]ell biologists and experts in the
anatomy and physiology of the developing embryo are unable to provide a
satisfactory answer to the question of when a separate human life begins."
96
As Professor David Smolin points out, however, Tribe, in his constitutional
law treatise, concedes that the fetus is human life.Y What, though, about
"separateness"? On this point, the 1989 testimony of Dr. Jerome Lejeune
in the "frozen embryo" case9" is instructive. Dr. Lejeune, one of the.world's
leading geneticists,9 stated that from the time of conception:
when this information carried by the sperm and by the ovum has
encountered each other, then a new human being is defined because
its own personal and human constitution is entirely spelled out...
a personal constitution which is entirely typical of this very one
human being which has never occurred before and will never occur
again ... it's not a definition to build a theoretical man, but to
build that particular human person we will call later Margaret or
Paul or Peter, it's already there.1 °
While this conclusion concerning uniqueness from fertilization once was
based upon "statistical certainty," now, due to recent advances, it is "an
experimentally demonstrated fact." 10'
The conclusion that separate human life exists from conception does
not necessarily mean that "personhood" exists from that event. Professor
Smolin states that the term "person":
can be used in many senses: legal, philosophical, or theological.
Arguably, it is not a scientific term at all. Science can tell us
95. Id. at 119.
96. Id.
97. See Smolin, supra note 5, at 657 (quoting LAuRENCE H. TBE, AMEsmcA CoNsn-
TuTioNAL LAW 1348-49 (2d ed. 1988) (footnote omitted)).
98. Davis v. Davis, 1989 WL 140495 (Tenn. Cir., Sept. 21, 1989), rev'd, 1990 WL 130807
(Tenn. App., Sept. 13, 1990), aff'd, 1992 WL 115574 (Tenn. June 1, 1992).
99. In his own words, Dr. Lejeune "discovered the first disease due to a chromosomal
mistake in man which is Down's Syndrome." The Custody Dispute Over Seven Human
Embryos: The Testimony of Professor Jerome Lejeune 46 (pamphlet published by the Center
for Law & Religious Freedom of the Christian Legal Society) [hereinafter Testimony]. For this
discovery Dr. Lejeune received the Kennedy Prize and the William Allen Memorial Award,
which he describes as "the highest award that you can get in genetics in the world." Id.
100. Id. at 50, 53.
101. Id. at 55-57. The advances referred to include the ability to process DNA so as to
produce a "DNA bar code" for each individual. Id. at 56. For a discussion of the use of this
so-called "DNA fingerprinting" by forensic science, see Sally E. Renskers, Comment, Trial
by Certainty: Implications of Genetic 'DNA Fingerprints', 39 EMORY L.J. 309 (1990).
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whether an organism is an individual; whether it is alive; whether
it is of the species homo sapiens. In one sense, the "personhood"
debate is between those who would accord legal or moral person-
hood to all those who are individual, live organisms of our species,
and those who use a restrictive definition.
0 2
In this 'personhood' debate," Smolin praises the prolife movement for its
refusal "to accept a definition of personhood that excludes some forms of
individual human life."' 0 3 Smolin argues that "[riestrictive definitions of
personhood" are undesirable because they "are always open to reinterpre-
tation, and thus are subject to the political, philosophical or theological
proclivities-and the raw self-interest-of those in power."' 0
4
As strikingly illustrated by three of Tribe's prochoice reviewers, restric-
tive concepts of personhood are indeed dangerous. °0 Tribe initially seems
102. Smolin, supra note 5, at 657-58.
103. Id. at 659.
104. Id.
105. Professor Braucher, in outlining a prochoice "moral scheme," compares the "claim
to personhood" of a preborn baby of eight weeks gestational age to that of the pregnant
woman. Braucher, supra note 12(B), at 600. The preborn child falls far short due to the
woman's "fully realized personhood ... with her social history, commitments and responsi-
bilities." Id. This concept of personhood would be difficult to meet for children of up to
several years in age.
Infants (and perhaps toddlers and beyond) would have similar difficulties qualifying as
persons under Professor Allen's standard of "self-conscious, rational, moral agency." Allen,
supra note 12(B), at 193. Nor would these groups fare any better under another view of
personhood discussed by Allen. In asserting that restrictive abortion laws interfere with the
privacy "interest of physical seclusion," Allen criticizes Justice Blackmun's statement in Roe
"that as pregnancy progresses a woman 'cannot be isolated."' Id. at 187 (quoting 410 U.S.
at 159). To Allen:
Justice Blackmun's characterization of pregnant women as ipso facto not "isolated"
problematically assumes that the unborn are the metaphysical and moral equivalents
of persons for purposes of describing conditions of privacy. To treat the unborn as
relevant for purposes of the discourse of physical seclusion, even though they do
not watch and listen in ways that give rise to modesty and shame, requires an
argument.
Id. We find deeply troubling a test that accords personhood status depending upon whether
one evokes in another feelings of "modesty and shame." Infants and small children are not
the only ones at risk under such a test. If the evaluator were particularly immodest and
shameless, would not all of us (women too) be in danger of losing our personhood?
While the content of Professor Allen's standards of personhood is alarming, the danger
of a restrictive definition is equally well-illustrated by the fact that Allen discusses two standards
in the same article. She apparently cannot settle upon which should govern. Also of concern
is Allen's statement that in weighing the "inchoate potential of the unborn" against "the
more tangible potential of the pregnant woman," the latter should prevail "jelxcept perhaps
in a grossly underpopulated community." Id. at 193-94. Factoring demographic considerations
into an evaluation of personhood creates additional risks. While in Allen's example underpop-
ulation allows the fetus's personhood to trump that of the woman (and thus deny the woman
a right to abort), what if there were overpopulation in certain age categories? Could excessive
individuals be deemed "nonpersons" and terminated?
Other evidence of the dangers of restrictive views of personhood is seen in Professor
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to agree, for he rejects Professor Frances Olsen's argument that '[fletal
life has value when people with power value it."' °6 As Tribe expresses it:
[t]he same thing once was said of slaves: the value of black
Americans was less than the value of white Americans in the view
of people with power. It once was said of women, who were deemed
property in the early law of much of Europe, Britain, and some of
the colonies. And it once was said of some infants and may be said
even today, by some, about the severely deformed. 107
Mary Dunlap's criticism of Tribe for stating that, with respect to fetuses that look human
and feel pain, "'few ... [could] avoid the sense of tragic choice that each abortion entails."'
Dunlap, supra note 12(B), at 61 (quoting TRIBE, supra note 1, at 230). Dunlap says that not
everyone would agree. "Is the choice to abort inevitably tragic? Is the choice to give birth
inevitably joyous?" Id. Dunlap resents Tribe's implication that those who do not share his
view "that abortion is a tragic choice are extremists." Id. Implicit in Dunlap's critique is the
notion that the personhood of the fetus, despite its physical attributes, depends upon the
woman's feelings. Even for a "baby pushing though the birth canal," Dunlap apparently
would accord personhood or not according to the mother's emotional reaction to the birth.
Id. at 60 n.96. We do not hesitate to describe Dunlap's view of personhood, grounded as it
is totally in others' feelings, as an "extreme" position. Would anyone be safe under such a
principle?
106. TRIBE, supra note 1, at 119 (quoting Olsen, supra note 26, at 128).
107. Id. With respect to black Americans, Professor Carter writes that to "many people
with power, the slaves were a sub-species, not fully human, which justified their masters in
holding them in thrall and making all decisions for them." Carter, supra note 12(C), at 2761.
How then, Carter asks, does one explain the fact that our laws prohibit slavery but allow
abortion? If the state cannot override the woman's decision as to the moral status of the
preborn, why should it "be able to override the slaveholder's claim that what he is enslaving
is not human [?]" Id. Carter's proffered explanation is to focus upon
what the two protestors, the slaveholder and the pregnant woman, are trying to
accomplish. Here the conscription argument for reproductive freedom might be
brought into play. The slaveholder wants to control what the state seeks to liberate,
whereas the woman seeks to rid herself of what the state seeks to force her to keep;
without regard to the humanity of the object, then, one seeks control of what the
state wishes to make free, while the other seeks freedom from that which the state
wishes to make her control. The distinction, then, turns not at all on the question
of who has the right to determine personhood, and much more on the liberal bias
toward freedom rather than control; so that even if the fetus and the slave are both
human, the result that slavery is prohibited and abortion is allowed is both coherent
and consistent.
Id. at 2761-62.
We find Carter's distinction unconvincing. It is premised in the validity of describing
state abortion restrictions as "conscription" of a woman's body. While this is a common
rhetorical device (Tribe uses it at several points; see TRIBE, supra note 1, at 114-15, 226, 241),
this view ignores the fact that the state does not cause a woman's pregnancy. Other than in
cases of rape, a woman becomes pregnant as a result of her decision to engage in sexual
intercourse. The state initially does not "conscript" her body; the woman offers it through
the assumed risk of having sex. (For why we would prohibit abortion even in cases of rape,
see infra notes 178-88 and accompanying text.)
Nor does forced continuation of the pregnancy constitute an illegitimate "conscription."
Tribe himself defines the woman's liberty interest as the freedom to decide "whether her body
is to carry a baby until she becomes a parent." Id. at 104. Tribe acknowledges that this right
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For Tribe, might does not make right. 08 The fact that members of minority
groups are "degraded sometimes by the law" does not mean that they are
not human beings.' °9 There must be a way "to import into the law some
moral view from a perspective external to that of those with power, or we
will be trapped in a moral world of, by, and for the powerful."" 0
Professor Jean Braucher criticizes Tribe for equating "Olsen's position
with a moral code of 'might makes right.' Olsen's true view, according
to Braucher, is "that the pregnant woman should be the one to decide the
value of the fetus ... not on a 'might makes right' basis, but on an
evaluation of the relative harms that would result from the pro-choice as
opposed to the pro-life legal approach.""12 The chief harm of opposing
abortion, Braucher states (quoting Olsen), is that 'one [thereby] cooperates
with the devaluation of women's lives and paves the way for further
devaluation of life.""'" In fact, even '.[t]he possibility of valuing fetal life
from an early stage exists because of the systematic undervaluation of
women's lives. If women were taken seriously, early fetal life would not be
valued by society at large unless and until the woman carrying the fetus
valued it."'1
4
ends once a child is in existence: "there is certainly no right to commit infanticide," id. at
99, and "one obviously has no right ... to kill one's offspring." Id. at 224. Logically, the
next critical step would be to determine when does an infant or offspring exist, thereby
terminating the woman's right. We have seen, however, that Tribe, by defending the right to
abort even if the fetus is a person, "see supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text, fails to
complete this logical progression. Carter apparently would not be concerned. Under his
language, the "conscription" theory would justify abortion even if the fetus were in fact fully
human because the woman would be seeking "freedom from that which the state wishes to
make her control." This formulation would compel Carter also to attack laws prohibiting
infanticide, because, by "conscripting" the physical and other resources needed to raise a
child, the laws interfere with parents who seek freedom from the responsibility for their
children that the state would impose.
In the final analysis, it is impossible to accept Professor Carter's conclusion that it is
"coherent and consistent" to prohibit slavery but to allow abortion. The weakness of his
assertion does not consist only of the fact that his defense of abortion would support infanticide
as well. In addition, he does not persuasively show that laws prohibiting slavery are any
different from laws prohibiting abortion. He would justify the former as restraining "[t]he
slaveholder [who] wants to control what the state seeks to liberate." Carter, supra note 12(C),
at 2761. What, though, is a more ultimate form of control over another than the unfettered
right to kill? Laws prohibiting abortion can be defended as state attempts to liberate preborn
persons (recall that Carter assumes fetal personhood) from others whose desire is to control
them by killing them. From this perspective, state involvement is an all-or-nothing proposition.
The state should either protect all persons or leave the issue of whether particular persons
should be enslaved or killed to individual discretion.
108. TRIBE, supra note 1, at 120.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Braucher, supra note 12(B), at 615 (footnote omitted).
112. Id. (footnotes omitted).
113. Id. at 616 (footnote omitted) (quoting Olsen, supra note 26, at 132).
114. Id. (footnote omitted) (quoting Olsen, supra note 26, at 128).
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Professor Olsen's view that taking women seriously requires vesting
them with absolute discretion to assess the value of "early fetal life" is a
proposition that we will refute in Part II. It suffices now to point out the
unsubstantiated presupposition in Professor Olsen's approach: it is illegiti-
mate even to consider whether 'early fetal life' might have value in his/
her own right because by definition doing so undervalues women. A skeptic
could easily conclude that this formulation is an attempt to discourage
thoughtful inquiry in areas which an abortion advocate would rather leave
unexplored.
Professor Braucher would vest even more discretion in women than
would Olsen: individual pregnant women should decide the "moral status"
of the fetus,'"' apparently regardless of his/her developmental age. 1 6 Pro-
fessor Tribe, drawing on the external moral standard of intuition, recoils:
"Inlearly everyone, surely, would think it profoundly wrong if 'people with
power' [in this case, the child's mother] chose to treat an admittedly 'unborn'
infant, struggling to push itself through the birth canal during the final
minutes of its mother's labor, as not yet a person morally entitled to our
protection and love."" 7 Tribe wonders, however, whether it would be
morally wrong to take this position "with respect to a just fertilized, twenty-
three-hour-old one-cell embryo or with respect to a more fully developed
fetus that has begun to display higher-level neurological activity?"" 8 Re-
grettably, Tribe does not proceed to evaluate the issue he poses. Instead,
after stating that the moral question is "difficult (and perhaps intractable),"
Tribe begins to examine whether the Constitution as it exists today protects
embryos as persons." 9
Why was Tribe so evasive? Perhaps it is because if he had grappled
with the moral, as contrasted with the constitutional issue, he would have
become quite uncomfortable with his defense of Roe's holding that viability
is the earliest point at which a state can intervene to protect fetal life.
Elsewhere in Abortion, for example, Tribe states that to most Americans:
the more the fetus is like a baby, the more we must admit that the
moral picture reveals two beings. Even someone who is strongly
pro-choice but who has seen an ultrasound picture of a fetus may
115. Id. at 618.
116. At one point in her article, Professor Braucher states that "viability is a possibility
for a logical point at which legal restrictions to protect [the fetus] should begin." Id. at 600.
She then immediately states, however, that the "fetus should never be viewed as having an
equal claim to personhood with the pregnant woman.... ." Id. Moreover, Braucher explicitly
states that by "fetus" she refers "to every stage of pre-birth human development after
fertilization." Id. at n.31. Thus, her unqualified statement that individual pregnant women
should determine a fetus's "moral status" gives women this discretion up until birth.
117. TamE, supra note 1, at 120. Professor Dunlap disagrees and even chastises Tribe for
this statement. See supra note 105.
118. TsmE, supra note 1, at 120.
119. Id.
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be offended by any suggestion that only one human life is at
stake. 120
In another passage, Tribe states that "as soon as abortion involves a fetus
that is recognizably human in form, or when it involves a fetus that one
might imagine feeling pain, few of us can avoid the sense of tragic choice
that each abortion entails."' 2' Under these standards, the line of moral
personhood would be pushed much earlier than the viability line of twenty-
four weeks'2 from conception. Both are satisfied at least by the middle of
the thirteenth week of pregnancy, and perhaps as early as the end of the
ninth week.'2 The fact is that viability has nothing to do with personhood.
Rather, it refers to the point at which the fetus can live outside the womb
with any necessary artificial help. 24 The concept is thus merely a measure-
ment of the level of sophistication of life support systems available at a
given time, or, for that matter, in a given city or in a given hospital on
any particular day. 125 Tribe's defense of this standard, which by his own
statements has no moral relevance to the personhood of the fetus, is yet
another indication of fetal "ghostliness" under Tribe's approach.
2 6
There comes a point, of course, as one moves earlier in the pregnancy,
when Tribe's intuitive standards of personhood may not be met. Tribe, for
example, suggests that for most people abortion presents no significant
moral difficulties when "performed in the very beginning stages of preg-
nancy, when the embryo is a tiny, visually undifferentiated, multicelled
growth without discernibly human features."' 27 This emphasis upon how
120. Id. at 138. For a discussion of the impact of ultrasound technology on the abortion
debate, see infra note 133.
121. Id. at 230. This statement angers prochoice reviewer Professor Mary Dunlap. See
supra note 105.
122. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 160 (1973).
123. For the point at which the fetus is recognizably human, see supra note 5. As to fetal
pain during abortions, it is a "reasonable medical certainty that the fetus can sense pain at
least by 13-1/2 weeks [gestational age]." VINCENT J. CoLLis ET AL., FEAL PAIN AND ABORTION:
Tn MEDICAL EVIDENCE 8 (Pamphlet No. 18, Law and Medicine Series, Legal Defense Fund
of Americans United for Life (1984)). It is "probable" that pain is experienced "between 8
and 13-1/2 weeks." Id.
124. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 160.
125. Professor McConnell argues that "the mora-legal status of a being should not
depend on such contingent factors." McConnell, supra note 12(A), at 1199. He also notes
that "[t]he emerging consensus, even among pro-choice scholars, other than Tribe, is that
'viability" is becoming increasingly irrelevant to the abortion debate."' Id. (footnote omitted)
I(quoting KAT=EN MCDONNELL, Not an Easy Choice 45 (1984)).
126. We have previously discussed Tribe's argument that even if a fetus could be removed
from the mother without destroying him/her, killing the fetus might be justified. See supra
notes 85-91 and accompanying text. To say that the fetus can be removed and saved is to say
that the fetus is viable. Tribe nonetheless believes that the mother might have the right to kill
the child. Tribe's purported recognition of a viability limitation on the mother's discretion is
thus shown to be meaningless.
127. TRIE, supra note 1, at 230. It is important to note that the bulk of abortions
performed in America today involve fetuses who are more developed than Tribe's description.
See Smolin, supra note 5, at 656-57.
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people feel as the way to. determine the value to be accorded young fetuses
is not defensible. Human intuition has not proven to be the most reliable
moral standard. As we have noted, Tribe himself recognizes that in the case
of black Americans and others, "people with power" have often treated
those without it as less than fully human.'2 This oppression, based in large
part upon the powerful's "intuition" concerning the status of the power-
less, 29 has gradually been remedied as the law has accorded full protection
to previously disfavored classes. 30
Prolife advocates believe that fetuses, as undeniable individual and
genetically unique members of the human species, deserve the same protec-
tion of their lives as do other human beings.' A fetus's personhood should
128. See supra notes 107-10 and accompanying text.
129. Professor H.L.A. Hart writes that "[iln slave-owning societies the sense that the
slaves are human beings, not mere objects to be used, may be lost by the dominant group,
who may yet remain morally most sensitive to each other's claims and interests." H.L.A.
HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 196 (1961). He illustrates this with an episode from Mark Twain:
"Huckleberry Finn, when asked if the explosion of a steamboat boiler had hurt anyone,
replied, 'No'm: killed a nigger.' Aunt Sally's comment 'Well it's lucky because sometimes
people do get hurt' sums up a whole morality which has often prevailed among men." Id.
(Twain relates this incident approximately midway through chapter thirty-two of Huckleberry
Finn.)
Professor David Granfield references the Hart passage to support his contention that
"[s]ocieties and individuals within them often possess blind spots in matters of right and
justice that shock the dispassionate observer." DAvID GR.ANF , THE ABORTION DEcisioN
166 (1969). Granfield, who wrote in the pre-Roe era about the need to resist developing
pressure to liberalize abortion prohibitions, stated that "[t]he frequent reference to abortion
as a 'crime without victims' shows that this moral blindness is still possible." Id. While we
do not hear so much today the particular phrase which Professor Granfield criticizes, we
believe that his phrase "moral blindness" aptly describes the prochoice perspective in which
the personhood of the preborn is so thoroughly denigrated.
130. Full legal protection does not mean that there can be no justifiable killing of a
human being. Our society recognizes several legally blameless killings. Among these are killings
(1) in self-defense; (2) in war; and (3) to carry out legal executions. There also can be justifiable
killing of the preborn. See infra note 131 and accompanying text.
131. This means that the law should not allow the killing of a preborn person in any
situation in which the killing of a postbirth person would be prohibited. Tribe suggests that
such a standard would rule out abortion even where the life of the mother is endangered by
continuation of the pregnancy: "Especially if the woman initially chose to become pregnant,
how could we justify securing her survival by destroying her voluntarily conceived child? No
claim of self-defense could go this far." TamE, supra note 1, at 122. We agree, however, with
Professor Smolin, who defends a life of the mother exception based on a self-defense analogy.
Smolin, supra note 5, at 650. For criticism of the life of the mother exception, see ScHWARz,
supra note 5, at 167-74.
We do not accept two other commonly-acknowledged exceptions to abortion prohibitions:
(1) where pregnancy results from rape; and (2) where the fetus is severely handicapped. Our
rejection of the rape exception is explained later in this article. See infra notes 178-88 and
accompanying text. Concerning the handicapped fetus, the crux of our position can be
understood by applying the basic principle with which we began this footnote. If some tragedy
befell an infant which caused a severe handicap, the law does not free the mother to respond
by killing the baby. Neither should the law allow the mother to kill her handicapped baby
within the womb.
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not depend upon his/her stage of development. Professor Olsen would
disagree:
refusal to distinguish between embryos, fetuses, and newborn babies
is simplistic and untrue to the experience and common sense of
most women and men. An early miscarriage is very different from
a stillbirth. Birth control that prevents implantation of a blastocyst
is different from a first trimester abortion. Most people experience
the loss suffered from a miscarriage as less severe than the death
of a newborn baby.
3 2
Focusing upon Olsen's last statement concerning miscarriage allows us
to consider her point. Even if we assume that her assessment of most
people's relative loss experience is accurate, what does it mean? It could
reflect the fact that the fetus prior to birth has not had the same oppor-
tunities as the newborn to become known.' Similarly, the death of a
newborn might not evoke the same pain as the death of a one-year old or
a twelve-year old. This emotional differentiation does not mean that the
newborn is less human.
One wonders also how Professor Olsen, and Tribe himself, would deal
with those whom she places in the minority-people who experience mis-
carriage as equivalent to losing a child. Consider the poignant account of
Dr. Dan Doriani. 3 4 Upon his wife's miscarriage of their unborn child (age
eleven weeks), the attending physician said "in techno-babble and euphe-
mism. 'Incomplete spontaneous abortion ... I need to remove the product
of conception ... there is some tissue here ... I need to remove this
tissue'.11135 Dr. Doriani's response?:
Tissue! Horror and anger, stilled by numbness welled within. "That's
not tissue, that's my baby," I thought, I shouted, within "Why
can't he say it!?-'I'm sorry Mr. and Mrs. Doriani, your baby is
dead.' He won't even call it a fetus! Doesn't he know what's
happening here? Our baby has died and he doesn't even know
it!' 13
6
132. Olsen, supra note 26, at 127.
133. Technological advances have made it increasingly possible better to know the preborn.
One of us (Andrea) recently had her fourth child. During the pregnancy, ultrasounds at eleven,
seventeen, and nineteen weeks gestational age gave Andrea and her husband their first visual
experiences of their baby daughter. During all three sonograms, their child moved and turned
frequently as the ultrasonographer took various measurements of her bones and organs. On
the last occasion, the first image on the screen showed the baby's hand holding her feet;
fingers and toes were clearly visible. The baby also yawned three times.
In addition to helping open a "window into the womb" for parents, improved ultrasound
techniques are impacting those who provide abortion services. Dr. Joseph Randall, after having
performed an estimated 32,000 abortions, quit doing so in 1983 because ultrasound had
convinced him that 'there were full-fledged human beings in there,' .. " Mimi Hall, Legal
Abortions Tougher to Get, USA TODAY, May 1, 1991, at 7A.
134. Dan Doriani, Reflection on Miscarriage, THE PCA MESSENGER, April 1991, at 17.
135. Id. at 18.
136. Id.
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Others in Dr. Doriani's position might not have experienced this mis-
carriage so powerfully. The fetus, however, would have been exactly the
same entity in either case. He/she would also have been the same entity
had Dr. Doriani's wife sought an abortion a few days before because she
had decided that she did not want to have a baby. Under this hypothetical,
would the fact that the fetus was unwanted mean that he/she was any less
of a person than the real fetus whose death a few days later Dr. Doriani
experienced as a child's death? The point is that "emotional attachment"
and "wantedness" are far too subjective to serve as standards of person-
hood. The most defensible way to avoid them is to confer personhood
status-and with it legal protection-at the point when science tells us that
individual human life begins: conception.'
II. TAKING WOMEN SERIOUSLY
A. Liberty
The thesis of this essay is that a comprehensive prolife perspective,
under which a fetus's right to life is protected from the time of conception,
is the only approach to abortion which accomplishes Professor Tribe's goal
of treating neither fetuses nor women as "ghosts." When one recalls
Professor Olsen's statement that even '[tjhe possibility of valuing fetal life
137. It is instructive to consider an exchange which occurred at the trial in the "frozen
embryo" case, see supra note 98, between Dr. Jerome Lejeune and Charles Clifford, the cross-
examining attorney:
Q. I will ask you directly, Dr. Lejeune: You have referred to the zygote [the fertilized
ovum] and the embryo as quote 'early human beings.'
A. Yeah.
Q. Do you regard an early human being as having the same moral rights as a later
human being such as myself?
A. ... As far as your nature is concerned, I cannot see any difference between
the early human being you were and the late human being you are, because in both
case[s], you were and you are a member of our species. What defines a human
being is: He belongs to our species .... I would say very precisely that I have the
same respect, no matter the amount of kilograms and no matter the amount of
differentiation of tissues.
Q. Dr. Lejeune, let me make sure I understand what you are telling us, that the
zygote should be treated with the same respect as an adult human being?
A. I'm not telling you that because I'm not in a position of knowing that. I'm
telling you, he is a human being, and then it is a Justice who will tell you whether
this human being has the same rights as the others. If you make difference between
human beings, that is, on your own to prove the reasons why you make that
difference. But as a geneticist you ask me whether this human being is a human,
and I would tell you that because he is a being and being human, he is a human
being.
Testimony, supra note 99, at 70.
We submit that Dr. Lejeune has plainly stated the chief challenge to those who assert a
restrictive view of personhood: they must offer a morally compelling rationale for their
position. Attempts by prochoice advocates to do so have been woefully inadequate. See, e.g.,
supra note 105; infra note 146 (discussion of quickening).
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from an early stage"' involves undervaluing women,'38 substantiating our
thesis would appear to be somewhat difficult. Tribe increases the challenge
by referring to many prolifers as those "who can readily envision the
concrete humanity of a fetus, who hold its picture high and weep, [but
who] barely see the woman who carries it and her human plight."'3 To
them, Tribe says, "Where is the person who develops, nurtures, and sustains
the fetus we are looking at? Where is the woman? In this vision, she is
insignificant, devalued. When a woman does somehow momentarily enter
our view, she is rendered translucent, a ghost of a real person."'
' 4
Concerning the "human plight" which could lead to a decision to abort,
Tribe emphasizes the burdens of pregnancy: the "significant restrictions of
a woman's physical liberty," the "substantial medical risk," and the pro-
found intrusion of bodily integrity.' 41 He also chastises prolifers who blithely
dismiss as "convenience" abortions those abortions actually motivated by
tragic circumstances ... [Is an abortion a matter of mere conven-
ience for impoverished single mothers who can barely support their
current children? For teenage girls who believe a pregnancy would
ruin their future and cause them shame in their communities? For
women who find themselves pregnant after their husbands have left
them or died? 42
These serious consequences of unwanted pregnancy lead Tribe to con-
clude that "laws telling a woman she must remain pregnant deprive her of
the very core of liberty and .privacy."' 43 Such laws "reduce women to 'mere
instrumentalities of the state' ... [by taking] 'diverse women with every
variety of career, life-plan, and so on, and [making] mothers of them
all." 44 To avoid this-to give any meaning whatever to a woman's "in-
dividual rights and human dignity, "-women must have "the freedom to
decide whether or not to endure pregnancy."'14 5
Professor Celeste Condit agrees with Tribe as to the centrality of
abortion rights in achieving liberty for women. Being pregnant affects
women's lifestyle choices because "[a] mother, by definition, is a person-
in-a-relationship. Almost anything a mother does (smokes cigarettes, eats
chocolate, uses a jack-hammer, goes jogging) affects another living entity,
one that is becoming a person."' 4 This mothering relationship, moreover,
138. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
139. TRIE, supra note 1, at 5.
140. Id. at 136.
141. Id. at 103.
142. Id. at 136.
143. Id. at 104.
144. Id. (footnotes omitted) (quoting Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HAgv.
L. REv. 737, 790 & 788 (1989)).
145. Id.
146. Condit, supra note 12(B), at 909. Condit chooses "quickening" as the point at which
the pregnant woman becomes a mother. Id. The Roe Court defined quickening as "the first
REVIEW OF ABORTION
does not end with a child's birth. Condit quotes Tribe to the effect that.
'[p]regnancy does not merely "inconvenience" the woman for a time; it
gradually turns her into a mother and makes her one for all time.""Y 
47
Women must therefore be free "to secure the status of 'not-mother."
' "'
recognizable movement of the fetus in utero, appearing usually from the 16th to the 18th
week of pregnancy." 410 U.S. at 132 (footnote omitted). This event is crucial to Condit
because, "[w]hether or not we see the fetus as a full individual in its own right, the historical
significance of ... quickening indicates quite clearly, as does the testimony of individual
women, that the fetus is experienced relationalIy from that point." Condit, supra note 12(B),
at 909 n.20.
While Condit concedes that at quickening the fetus is in a relationship with his/her
mother, she falls short of acknowledging the personhood of the quick fetus. This suggests that
to her a fetus even after quickening might not be a person. Conversely, we contend that there
is nothing about quickening to support the argument that fetuses prior to that point are not
persons. Professor Condit stresses quickening because it is after this event that the fetus is
"experienced relationally." We reject this factor as the standard of personhood. A human
being is a human being even if he/she lives in complete isolation from others. Even if being
"experienced relationally" were accepted as the key criterion, quickening is not the first time
that this occurs for the preborn. We have previously shown, for example, how ultrasound
technology makes this possible long before. See supra note 133.
Quickening merely is the point at which the mother physically feels her baby. This is
primarily a function of the baby's size. Dr. and Mrs. WilIke write that:
[t]he baby has to be almost a foot long (30 cm.) and weigh about one pound (454
gm.) before he or she is large enough to brace a shoulder against one wall [of the
uterus] and kick hard enough against the opposite wall to dent it outward. Then
the mother feels it because the outside of the uterus is covered by a sensitive
peritoneal surface.
WrLLKE, supra note 52, at 46. We submit that size is a morally irrelevant criterion of
personhood.
Only the baby's movement is left as possibly making quickening a morally significant
event. Movement, though, is irrelevant to personhood. Are paralyzed people nonpersons? Even
if movement were accorded moral significance, it is undeniable that the preborn move weeks
before the mother is aware of it. A recent video, ULTRAsouND: EYEwmNss To r=n EARLxeST
DAYS OF Lia (Sound Wave Images 1990), using ultrasound technology, shows preborn babies
moving inside their mothers by the seventh week following conception. By the tenth week,
vigorous movement is visible, including very energetic jumping.
147. Condit, supra note 12(B), at 909 (quoting TRME, supra note 1, at 104). In contrast
to Condit's focus upon quickening, Tribe believes that the final transformation of the pregnant
woman into a mother does not occur until birth. See TRamE, supra note 1, at 114, 135. Our
argument in Part I was that the personhood of the preborn should be acknowledged from
conception. We would therefore agree with Pat Goodson that "if a woman is pregnant, she
is already a mother." Goodson, supra note 5, at 72. Goodson, by the way, agrees with Tribe
that once motherhood is attained, it is a lifelong condition. She writes that the pregnant
woman "cannot 'unbecome' a mother. Her only options are to be the mother of a dead child
or the mother of a live child." Id. The truth of this statement is being tragically revealed to
the many women who later realize that in choosing to abort, they were in fact choosing to
kill their own child. See infra notes 206-09 and accompanying text.
148. Condit, supra note 12(B), at 909. Under Condit's view of when motherhood begins,
if abortion is allowed after quickening it would not prevent motherhood because motherhood
would have already begun. Such an abortion thus would be to allow the mother to kill her
own child (can there be a mother if there is no child?). If we assume hypothetically that
Condit, who defends Roe, id. at 903-04, also accepts fetal viability as the point at which the
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Permissive abortion laws "are fundamental to ... Liberty because they are
the ultimate guarantor that no woman will have to be a mother against her
will.' ' 49 Such laws also "will establish a legal status for women as persons,
rather than as essentially proto-mothers."' 50
Professor Tribe, backed by Professor Condit, appears to make a com-
pelling case that abortion license is a prerequisite to taking women seriously.
The problem, of course, is the effect that this approach has upon fetuses-
millions have been killed, revealing a serious (if not total) devaluation of
fetal life. Our premise in Part II is that a preborn person exists from
conception. Killing by abortion, therefore, should not be permitted except
under circumstances in which society would permit the killing of any other
person. 5' Applying this standard, though, presumably would mean that
abortions would not be allowed in any of the "tragic circumstances"'
5 2
described by Tribe.' Women's liberty would appear to be inescapably
impaired. Perhaps Tribe was correct after all in his initial description of
the abortion controversy. Is it possible to value either fetal life or women's
liberty without completely devaluing the other side of the equation?
We believe that considering anew what it means to "take a person
seriously" shows a path out of the dilemma. An important component of
the phrase's meaning is to hold a person morally responsible for the
reasonably foreseeable consequences of his/her conduct. One of us recently
saw this concept movingly expressed upon attending the bar mitzvah of the
son of a colleague. The ceremony signifies the passing of boyhood into
manhood, with an accompanying acceptance of certain important respon-
sibilities. Everyone there, including the young man so solemnly charged,
knew that his new duties reflected the fact that he was now being viewed
more seriously than before.
While a bar mitzvah has special religious significance, the underlying
concept expressed is a common phenomenon. Both of us are parents. As
our children mature, we take them more seriously by holding them more
preborn can be protected, this means that she is perfectly willing to have a mother become a
'not-mother' by killing her child between quickening and viability (if not beyond). See infra
note 149.
149. Condit, supra note 12(B), at 910. One wonders how Condit would feel about
infanticide, which is also a method of keeping a woman from being "a mother [of a live
child] against her will." She approves abortion of quick fetuses, even after acknowledging
that they are then "experienced relationally" by their mothers. Id. at 909 n.20. Moreover, it
apparently is of no special concern to Condit "[w]hether or not [at quickening] we see the
fetus as a full individual in its own right." Id. If Condit would allow abortions for a fetus
who undeniably is in a relationship with his/her mother and might in addition be a "full
individual," would the step to infanticide for her be unthinkable?
150. Id. at 910-11.
151. See supra notes 130-31 and accompanying text.
152. See supra text accompanying note 142.
153. However hard the circumstances, our laws would not permit an impoverished single
mother, a teenage mother, or a divorcde or widow to meet the crisis by killing a six-month
old baby. Preborn persons should receive the same protection.
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accountable for their actions. What is missing in Tribe's account of un-
wanted pregnancies is any real recognition of the moral desirability of
holding both parties responsible for the consequences of their actions. 54 A
woman does not, though some prochoicers express it this way, suddenly
"[find herself] pregnant."' 55 Other than in the case of rape, 56 a woman
becomes pregnant as a result of the decision of both partners to engage in
sexual intercourse. 5 7 Often, no contraceptive is used. 58 Even when preg-
154. Erwin Griswold joins Tribe in this omission. This is surprising, for Griswold em-
phasizes what he calls "the moral approach" to the abortion question. Griswold, supra note
12(B), at 30. In fact, although Griswold generally praises Abortion, he criticizes Tribe for not
devoting more effort "to the fundamental moral question, and help[ing] us to find how that
can be made more widely a guiding way, and more conducive to self-restraint for young
Americans." Id. Curiously, however, Griswold's focus on morality pertains solely to a couple's
initial decision to have sexual relations. To Griswold:
[t]he best solution to the abortion problem.., and certainly the surest, is for young
American women to refrain from becoming pregnant, and for young American men
not to participate in making them so. It can be done, as many in earlier generations
did, just because it seemed to be the decent thing to do-aided no doubt by religious
and practical concerns.
Id.
While we agree with Griswold as to the desirability of "self-restraint for young Americans"
pertaining to having sex, we do not understand why his concern for morality ignores how the
couple should respond if an unwanted pregnancy actually occurs. Griswold's silence on this
point is especially perplexing because elsewhere in his review he criticizes those who view "[s]ex
... primarily as a source of pleasure, and rarely in terms of the mystery of life, and its
sacred character." Id. If life is "sacred," it would seem that a "moral approach" would
require grappling with the responsibilities of those whose acts bring new human life into
existence. Griswold, though, is content to approve the result in Roe, thereby endorsing a
regime in which mothers and fathers through abortion are permitted blatantly to violate their
parental duties. See supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
155. See, e.g., Marge Piercy, Foreword to ELLEN MESSER & KATHRYN E. MAY, BACK
RooMs: VoicEs FROM THE ILLEoAL ABORTION ERA at ix (1988).
156. We will follow Tribe's example and treat incest as "a particular kind of rape."
TRIBE, supra note 1, at 231.
157. Prochoice reviewer Professor Dunlap agrees. Dunlap, supra note 12(B), at 48. She
criticizes Tribe for "not squarely address[ing] ... the position that women who become
pregnant by acts of voluntary heterosexual intercourse are responsible for those pregnancies."
Id. In fact, Tribe does discuss the argument that "when the woman is 'responsible' for the
pregnancy, she loses at least her moral right to claim that its continuation interferes with her
autonomy." TRmE, supra note 1, at 132. Tribe concludes, however, in part for a reason very
similar to that given by Dunlap herself, that the woman's responsibility should not deprive
her of the right to an abortion. See infra notes 162-63 and accompanying text.
158. Tribe suggests that half of all abortion patients did not use contraceptives "during
the month in which they became pregnant." See id. at 205 (footnote omitted). Concerning
women who do not use contraceptives, Professor Braucher argues that "contraceptive risk-
taking" cannot be explained simply as a matter of female irresponsibility (although she fears
this interpretation by "an unsympathetic audience"). Braucher, supra note 12(B), at 622-23.
Rather, women take risks due to "the subtle, pervasive effects of gender roles and gender
hierarchy in this area of life." Id. at 622 (footnote omitted). For example, contraceptive use
implies "sexual availability and consequent loss of status and bargaining position with men."
Id. (footnote omitted); see TRImE, supra note 1, at 213. Such factors might indeed be a
disincentive to contraceptive use. The woman, however, still can choose either to use or not
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nancy results from contraceptive failure, the couple knew of that risk. 5 9
We believe that taking both the woman and the man seriously requires that
they be held responsible for the new preborn person whom they have
brought into existence.6°
With respect to a woman's accountability, Tribe fleetingly appears to
recognize the justice of prohibiting abortions for pregnancies not resulting
"from any sort of coercion."' 6' As previously noted, however, Tribe ulti-
mately rejects this approach based on the inapt liver transplant hypothetical
which he offers to show society's failure to require comparable sacrifices
of men.162 At one point, Tribe's premise seems to be that if a man cannot
be held accountable in the same way as a pregnant woman, then neither
party should be held accountable at all. 63 At another point, however, he
to use contraceptives. If she selects nonuse, she has apparently decided that the gains of
nonuse outweigh the risk of pregnancy. Thus, if pregnancy ensues, it was the result of a risk
voluntarily taken.
We would make the same point with respect to men who do not use contraceptives.
While Tribe does not address this issue in terms of percentages, he does point out that men
do not like condoms because "they reduce sensitivity." Id. at 213. A man who, for a moment's
enhanced pleasure, risks impregnating his sexual partner, might well be thought to have acted
irrationally. If, however, pregnancy actually ensues, it is a risk which he willingly, if foolishly,
took.
159. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
160. See supra notes 69-71 and accompanying text. What, though, if the sexual partners
are not a man and a woman, but a young girl and a young boy? Consider consensual sexual
relations between two fourteen-year olds. Do sexual partners this young really know the
potential consequences? In this age of early exposure, probably. Still, our moral accountability
principle does appear to have serious flaws in this context. Concerning the father, what does
it mean to hold a fourteen-year old boy to "all parental duties"? Concerning the mother, is
it not incongruous to hold this young teenager to "all parental duties," if, as we do, we
support (in the current regime of legalized abortion) parental notification legislation, which is
premised upon the lack of maturity of teenage girls?
These are good questions. Appropriate practical implementation of parental moral ac-
countability in this difficult setting will take considerable thought. At this stage, we will make
these few observations. The key principle is that there still is no basis for allowing an abortion.
See supra notes 151-53 and accompanying text. Concerning the father, to the extent that he
is unable to fulfill his duties, society may need to intervene to fill the gap. See infra note 188
(discussing a similar problem involving pregnancies due to rape). Concerning the mother, any
critique of our position based upon our support for parental notification laws is not persuasive.
We would ask, for example, a converse question of prochoice opponents of such laws. In
view of the many serious risks which abortion entails, see infra notes 200-15 and accompanying
text, is it not incongruous to argue that teenage girls are mature enough independently to
obtain an abortion, but not mature enough to be mothers? Pregnant girls need parental
support and guidance concerning the abortion decision. We believe the same to be true with
respect to the burdens of pregnancy, childbirth and raising the child. If the parents cannot or
will not provide this support, once again society may need to intervene.
161. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
162. See supra notes 73-78 and accompanying text.
163. See TRIBE, supra note I, at 132-33. Tribe focuses on the fact that men who engage
in sex "cannot be saddled [physiologically] ... with the responsibility of pregnancy.... It is
suspiciously easy to say that women should and must make an enormous sacrifice whenever
their sexual activity results in pregnancy, even though men need not." Id. at 133. This appears
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appears to reject the whole notion of holding someone accountable. Speaking
of society's unwillingness to "impose selfless and virtuous behavior on a
man," Tribe says that to do so "would demean his capacity for individual
choice and independence."' 64 Professor Condit supports this view, arguing
that acting "'irresponsibly' . . . is precisely what true Liberty allows us to
do-to make individual choices that are less than optimal.' '1 65 To Condit,
this "true Liberty" requires allowing women to "use abortion for sex
selection or for other 'frivolous reasons."")
66
We reject the notion that liberty means the freedom to act without
accountability. We also reject the idea that it demeans or undervalues the
individual to require accountability. 67 Surprisingly, our position receives
theoretical support from Professor Jean Braucher, whose view that each
pregnant woman should decide the "moral status" of the fetus we described
earlier. 6 Braucher criticizes Tribe for supporting abortion:
in terms of a woman's right to control her own body in order to
protect her liberty and autonomy.... Women have abortions be-
to be the view of Professor Dunlap as well. To her, "consideration of women's role in
becoming pregnant [should not] punish women for pregnancy by depriving [them] of abortion
choice, if we commit ourselves to the proposition that women and men must be treated equally
under the law, whatever fundamental differences have been programmed by nature or circum-
stances." Dunlap, supra note 12(B), at 49.
It is undeniable that the burdens of pregnancy to the woman are markedly greater than
those of her sexual partner. As we have argued, however, this is no reason to allow the woman
to avoid by abortion the consequences of the greater risk she took by having sex. See supra
notes 65-67 and accompanying text. The answer instead is to hold both parties morally
accountable by requiring them to accept full parental responsibilities. See supra notes 69-72
and accompanying text.
164. TRIE, supra note 1, at 135. We wonder what Tribe's opinion of laws prohibiting
drunk driving would be? Do such laws "impose selfless and virtuous behavior" and thereby
"demean [one's] capacity for individual choice and independence"? Presumably, Tribe would
say that drunk driving laws are appropriate because they prohibit active wrongdoing-
misfeasance. See infra note 180 and accompanying text. Tribe, however, views ending a
pregnancy through abortion as mere nonfeasance, a failure to rescue. See TRIBE, supra note
1, at 129-33. Such a characterization ignores the harsh reality of abortion. See supra notes
76-78 and accompanying text; infra notes 178-86 and accompanying text.
165. Condit, supra note 12(B), at 907-08. This quote actually is part of Condit's rebuke
of Tribe for emphasizing "the 'rational conduct' of women." Id. at 907. She refers to the
fact that Tribe criticizes "conservative legal restrictions on abortion [for presupposing] that
women will not make reasonable choices about abortion-either they will act hastily, they will
choose for frivolous reasons, or they will misrepresent their situations." Id. (footnotes omitted).
Condit's view of "true Liberty" is such that any inquiry into whether or not women act
responsibly "with regards to procreation and abortion" is anathema. See id. at 907-08. While
Condit scolds Tribe, Tribe's statement that imposing virtue upon a man "would demean his
capacity for individual choice and independence," supra text accompanying note 164, shows
that their views are not dissimilar.
166. Coudit, supra note 12(B), at 908.
167. Professor Mary Ann Glendon, referring to women, says that not holding them
"morally responsible" implies that they are too "weak" to be held accountable. Glendon,
supra note 12(A), at 58.
168. See supra notes 115-16 and accompanying text.
1992]
WASHINGTON AND LEE LA W REVIEW [Vol. 49:437
cause of the conditions and responsibilities of their lives, not pri-
marily as a vindication of an atomistic individualism. Women give
multiple reasons for having abortions, usually some combination of
the following: they are too young, too poor, too sick, too isolated;
they do not feel ready; they have not finished their formal education;
they have too many children to provide for and nurture already;
they are unmarried or having difficulty in a marriage; they lack a
social network. These women are concerned with relationships and
responsibilities. 69
Professor Braucher's argument, "that women usually have abortions
for moral reasons that are grounded in their values and sense of obligation
to others, including the fetus, and to themselves,' '1 70 is certainly more
appealing than the Tribe/Condit defense of irresponsibility.' 7, In the final
analysis, however, Braucher is not persuasive because a woman who con-
scientiously aborts is still killing another person. 7 2 Braucher stresses that
prochoicers on moral grounds have "very high aspirations for what parents
and society should provide for children in the way of emotional, social and
financial resources .... In this view, it is not illogical to think ... of a
woman's having an abortion in a spirit of love for the fetus ... ,'7 We
do not doubt that many women who have abortions fit the model that
Braucher describes. Nonetheless, our society does not freely permit mothers
to kill their one-year old babies if only they do so "in a spirit of love" to
save their children from lives involving some deprivation in terms "of
emotional, social and financial resources." Similarly, killing preborn babies
cannot be accepted as a morally responsible act.
Our argument in this subpart has been that holding women morally
accountable for their conduct does not reflect a failure to take them
169. Braucher, supra note 12(B), at 599 (footnotes omitted).
170. Id. at 611.
171. We must point out, though, that a woman's "sense of obligation" to herself might,
depending upon the circumstances, be just another way of referring to one's irresponsible
actions toward others. Braucher cites, for example, a 1987 survey which showed that seventy-
six percent of the women questioned answered "yes" to the following inquiry "concerning
their reasons for having abortions ... :" 'because having a baby would dramatically change
your life in ways you are not ready for?' Id. at 599 n.24 (quoting Torres & Forrest, Why
Do Women Have Abortions?, 20 FAm. PLAN. PERSP. 169, 170-71 (1988)). There is plenty of
room in such a response for that "vindication of an atomistic individualism" which Professor
Braucher eschews. See supra text accompanying note 169.
172. To the preborn child who is killed, it does not matter whether the mother aborts
because she wants to be able freely to smoke or eat chocolate (reasons which Condit would
recognize as sufficient, see supra notes 145-48 and accompanying text), or because she is
concerned about her ability "to provide for and nurture" her other children (one of the moral
reasons approved by Braucher, see supra text accompanying note 169).
173. Braucher, supra note 12(B), at 601 (footnotes omitted). See id. at 599 n.24; Dunlap,
supra note 12(B), at 58-59. This "kill with love" argument is but a variation of the standard
prochoice assertion, which we have previously refuted, that compassion for unwanted children
requires that women be allowed to abort. See supra note 41.
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seriously. To the contrary, moral accountability is an important touchstone
of the significance with which a person is viewed. We can anticipate,
however, a major criticism of our position. The principle of accountability
which we have thus far applied is premised in the voluntary assumption of
reasonably foreseeable risks. However, what if the circumstances which
make a particular pregnancy unwanted were not meaningfully foreseeable?
Take, for example, the story that Tribe relates concerning Kate Michelman,
now executive director of the National Abortion Rights Action League. She
"was pregnant with her fourth child when her husband left her for another
woman."' 74 And what of pregnancies that result from nonconsensual sex?
Those due to rape would be an obvious, tragic example. Moreover, there
is the argument which Tribe attributes to some feminist writers "that within
our society even most nominally 'consensual' sex, particularly in cases where
the woman does not feel free to use or to suggest the use of birth control,
involves coercion." 75 To the extent that risks are not reasonably foreseeable
or that pregnancy results from coercion, a critic might say that our "moral
accountability" edifice collapses.
We do not agree. The moral accountability principle is broad enough
to encompass even unforeseeable, nonconsensual circumstances. As an ex-
ample, consider a forty-year-old father of three whose sixty-five-year-old
father lives alone in the old family home. Although previously robust, the
older man contracts Alzheimer's disease. The young man could not have
meaningfully foreseen that such a tragedy could occur. He certainly did not
agree to accept the risk. Providing for the parent might very well disrupt
the young man's life, sap the emotional and financial resources needed for
his children, and all in all be very burdensome. Nonetheless, we contend
that the young man would have the moral responsibility to care for his
father.
Well and good, one might say, but how does this relate to laws
prohibiting abortion? Even if one concedes the young man's moral respon-
sibility to his father, the law does not compel the assumption of that duty.
7 6
This, of course, is the same point that Tribe made concerning his liver
transplant hypothetical: "[a]lthough the relationship between a parent and
a child carries with it more legal obligation than the relationship between
two strangers, nowhere do we require a voluntary parent to make, for an
174. TamE, supra note 1, at 134. It is significant that the feeling of desperation which
led Michelman to obtain an abortion resulted in large part from her lack of "resources to
support another child." See id. at 134-35. What about the husband who left? He certainly
had the moral and legal responsibility to support the child he had helped conceive. As we
have indicated, a comprehensive prolife approach must involve working to improve the
procedures available for holding men to their parental obligations. See supra notes 71-72 and
accompanying text.
175. Id. at 132; see also supra note 158.
176. See, e.g., ROLLIN M. PERKU s & RONALD N. BOYCE, CRnMNAL LAW 665 (3d ed.
1982).
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already born child, the kind of sacrifice some would have us impose on the
pregnant woman in the name of the fetus.'
1 77
Prohibiting abortion, yet not requiring the young man to help his
father, is justifiable for the same reasons we previously gave for not
compelling a father to provide liver tissue to his daughter. The son's not
assisting his father, like a father's not helping his daughter, is unlike a
woman's procuring an abortion. Abortion is malfeasance "because it con-
stitutes the affirmative act of removing the fetus from the uterus, usually
by dismemberment."' 78 Not acting to help the father or the daughter, 79 on
the other hand, constitutes nonfeasance because it is the failure to render
affirmative assistance. As Professor Smolin points out, Tribe himself "de-
clares the malfeasance/nonfeasance distinction to be fundamental to up-
holding autonomy: 'to make a man serve another is to make him a slave,
while to forbid him to commit affirmative wrongs is to leave him a free
man.''")
8 0
The "malfeasance/nonfeasance distinction" is also the answer to Judith
Thomson's unconscious violinist hypothetical, which she herself implicitly
recognizes as being most pertinent where pregnancy results from involuntary
sex. '8 Again, the assumption is that one awakens to find oneself attached
to an unconscious violinist. If he is detached, he will die. Tribe posits that
virtually everyone would say that the law should not compel continued
attachment.8 2 Thomson's scenario has, in Professor Smolin's phrase, "sur-
face appeal." ' Unplugging the violinist appears to be "mere nonfeasance
... [because] Thomson's hypothetical attachment.., an arbitrary creation
of medical science," has no normal duration.'14 Smolin points out, however,
that "pregnancy ... is a complex, self-regulating physiological process that
generally will continue for a certain period ... unless someone does
something: 'terminates' the pregnancy."'8 5 Consequently, to Smolin, inter-
rupting a pregnancy is unlike disconnecting the violinist:
Pregnancy "termination" upon examination is a nice euphemism
for acts that, from the viewpoint of both mother and fetus, are
quite active and quite forceful: usually an intrusion through the
cervix and into the uterus followed by physical dismemberment and
removal of the fetus; sometimes an intrusion followed by salt
poisoning of the fetus and then labor; occasionally surgical removal
of the fetus or artificial inducement of premature labor ....
Abortion interrupts the complex physiological, hormonal and psy-
177. TamE, supra note 1, at 133.
178. Smolin, supra note 5, at 643.
179. See supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text.
180. Smolin, supra note 5, at 643 (quoting TRmE, supra note 1, at 131).
181. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
182. See supra text accompanying note 63.
183. Smolin, supra note 5, at 643.
184. Id. at 644.
185. Id.
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chological relationship of mother and fetus in a manner that may
only be described as an active intrusion. Abortion is therefore
nothing like ... disattaching a mechanical tube. Abortion is un-
ambiguously an affirmative action-malfeasance-in the traditional
criminal law sense.
86
We believe that Professor Smolin's response to Thomson's hypothetical
is compelling. The law should not permit a mother's malfeasance'87 in
affirmatively killing her unborn child, even where the pregnancy resulted
from nonconsensual sex. 88 Since Tribe himself recognizes the importance
186. Viewing abortion as nonfeasance requires one to characterize it as a "mere failure[]
to continue the virtuous act of fetal rescue commonly called pregnancy." Id. at 645. The
"harsh reality of abortion, either as experienced by the woman or her unborn child," renders
any such characterization erroneous. Id.
187. Forbidding affirmative wrongs is one of the law's most common, yet most important,
functions. The fact that a particular prohibition may disproportionately affect one sex is not
necessarily objectionable. Tribe points out, for example, that "[o]nly men ... are physiolog-
ically capable of certain sorts of rape, but this does not make laws against such rape instances
of impermissible sex discrimination." TRiEE, supra note 1, at 133.
188. We believe that allowing rape victims to abort is wrong because abortion would
produce a "second innocent victim." See TRIaE, supra note 1, at 114 (recognizing that some
prolifers make this argument). The preborn person is no less so due to the nonconsensual sex
which conceived him/her. See id. at 232 (arguing that the prolife assertion that abortion should
be limited because it "constitutes the killing of an innocent human being ... [cannot] plausibly
be put forward by anyone who thinks that abortion should be permitted in cases of rape");
Goodson, supra note 5, at 68 n.4 (a prolife reviewer stating her complete agreement with
Tribe's point). Denying an abortion to rape victims, though, may seem ipso facto to devalue
women. Indeed, it is compassion for such victims which in part leads some prolifers to
recognize a rape exception to abortion prohibitions. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
There is a significant argument, however, that aborting the child conceived in a rape is not
truly in the best interest of the woman. DAVID C. REARDON, ABORTED WOMEN: SILENT No
MORE 188-218 (1987), examines this issue at length in a chapter which includes first person
testimonies of rape victims who became pregnant, aborted their child and later suffered great
harm from doing so. Reardon's conclusion is that rape (and incest):
involve psychiatric stresses that are ill-treated with abortion. The evidence shows
that pressures to abort ... arise primarily from outside sources, from the superstition
and prejudice that friends, family, and society hold against these "tainted" women.
When the desires of the victims are examined, it is found that the vast majority of
women pregnant from rape or incest actually desire to carry their children to term.
Psychologists confirm that this is a healthy response and is the most productive path
these women can take in reestablishing their self-images and renewing control over
their lives.
Id. at 205.
Reardon's conclusions are corroborated by Professor Stephen Schwarz. According to
Schwarz, "rape pregnancy" results in a "stigma"-"'that the woman is somehow "tainted"
or "dirtied" ....' There is also an assumption that the woman was somehow responsible ....
The result is a strong desire to get rid of the whole thing .... There is an obvious way to
do this: get rid of the visible sign of rape; abort the child." ScHWARZ, supra note 5, at 163
(footnote omitted) (quoting Sandra K. Mahkorn, Pregnancy and Sexual Assault, in THE
PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF ABORTION 53, 67 (David Mall and Walter F. Watts eds., 1979).
Schwarz condemns "[tihe absurdity and injustice" of an attitude which views the woman as
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to liberty of the malfeasance/nonfeasance distinction,8 9 we hope that he
eventually will be convinced to support laws generally prohibiting abor-
tion. 190 Doing so would not be to devalue women, who instead would be
accorded great significance through application of the moral accountability
principle.
B. Equality
The previous subpart has shown that a prolife perspective does not
fail to take women's liberty seriously. Tribe, however, also argues that
abortion restrictions devalue women by failing to accord them equality
with men:
[Such laws] so dramatically shape the lives of women, and only
of women, that their denial of equality hardly needs detailed
elaboration. While men retain the right to sexual and reproductive
autonomy, restrictions on abortion deny that autonomy to women.
Laws restricting access to abortion thereby place a real and sub-
anything other than an "innocent victim." Id. at 164. He also argues that:
abortion for rape is especially bad for women. The woman, already weakened and
devastated by the assault of the rapist, now becomes subject to another assault on
her body and spirit, the assault by the abortionist .... She may feel that abortion
is wrong, but that she must have one to please others or do what they insist is the
right thing .... Already made to feel vulnerable by the rapist, she is now made to
feel vulnerable by the pressure to abort: "Abortion promises only to compound the
trauma of rape with yet another experience of violence .... In an attempt to
overcome the violation of her own person, she does violence to another ... This
brings no peace of mind and no healing, only more pain and more regret."
Id. at 164-65 (footnote omitted) (quoting CURT YOUNG, TIE LEAST OF THESE: WHAT EVERYONE
SHOULD KNow ABOUT ABORTION 208 (1983)).
Schwarz believes that, rather than abortion, the best way to help the rape victim who
becomes pregnant is to support her in her pregnancy and in her efforts to deal with rape's
"emotional trauma .... There is no shortcut to coming to grips with pain. From a counseling
perspective, abortion is a simplistic and presumptuous suggestion .... In the course of choosing
life and sacrificing for the child within them, women ... have discovered a peace they never
imagined was possible."' Id. at 165 (footnote omitted) (quoting YOUNG, supra, at 207-08).
Protecting the preborn and rape victims themselves is in our view sufficient reason for
not recognizing a rape exception. There remains, however, another important issue. Our goal
of holding fathers to their parental responsibilities will be significantly more difficult in cases
of rape. It cannot reasonably be expected that the typical rapist will be very solicitous of the
welfare of any children conceived by the rape. Legal coercion will be an option in some cases,
such as date rape, where the rapist is known. Even here, however, the mother for obvious
reasons may find it intolerable to have any contact whatever with the rapist. Moreover, in
some instances the perpetrator will not even be known, much less caught. These matters merit
further thought and study. One possible response is to establish social programs to meet the
needs during the pregnancy of any rape victim who finds herself in exigent circumstances.
189. See supra text accompanying note 180.
190. Tribe's colleague Mary Ann Glendon believes that Tribe, primarily because of his
compassion "towards the weak, vulnerable, and disenfranchised ... will come ... to accord
more weight to the value of protecting human life than is ... expressed [in Abortion]."
Glendon, supra note 12(A), at 58.
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stantial burden on women's ability to participate in society as
equals. 191
In this quote, 192 one again sees reflected Tribe's perspective that a condition
of male-female mutual irresponsibility is a necessary characteristic of
society's response to unwanted pregnancies. Men have "reproductive au-
tonomy" (presumed translation: they are not held responsible when their
sexual activities result in pregnancy); equality therefore demands that the
same be true for women. As has been shown, we reject the morally
vacuous position that sexual partners be permitted to be equally irrespon-
sible when their activities produce a new human life. The preferred
paradigm of equality, which Tribe fails to consider, is joint responsibil-
ity.
93
Even if one assumes male "reproductive autonomy [irresponsibility],"
to be an irremediable fact, Tribe's defense of abortion as the path to
equality for women cannot withstand scrutiny. Ironically, Tribe's position
is inherently sexist. 194 One of its presuppositions is a disparaging attitude
towards pregnancy and motherhood. It is the burdens associated with
these conditions which impair a woman's ability to compete in the "real
world," or perhaps, more accurately, in a "man's world." Feminists have
made great strides in eradicating the assumption that pregnant women
should be removed from public view or, at least, prohibited from keeping
jobs. Similarly, there have been increasing workplace opportunities for
women with born children. Tribe, though, views women as captives of
their unique capacity to bear children. His perspective that surgical alter-
ation is a prerequisite to women's social equality is fundamentally anti-
women.1 9 It insists that women change their bodies to accommodate
191. TRmE, supra note 1, at 105. This passage is part of Tribe's argument that abortion
restrictions deny women "the 'equal protection of the laws' . . . guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment." Id. In this article, we are interested in moral dialogue, not constitutional
interpretation. See supra note 19. In our response to Tribe's "denial of equality" argument,
we will therefore consider equality in its moral, not constitutional, aspects.
192. Tribe's premise that abortion restrictions "dramatically shape" only "the lives of
women" is inaccurate. The other group most obviously impacted is the preborn, many more
of whom with legal protection will survive to birth. See infra note 217 and accompanying
text. Abortion restrictions, by protecting the preborn, also dramatically affect the lives of
those fathers who, because they accept the moral responsibilities of fatherhood, oppose
abortion. Such laws help ensure fulfillment of these fathers' desire to love and raise their
offspring.
193. Prochoicer Amy Gutmann provides support for our thesis. Since the sexual partners
share responsibility for any resulting pregnancy (she is speaking specifically of failed birth
control), she offers as "common ground" a vision of equality under which men and women
share the burdens of childbearing rather than placing them "solely upon women." Gutmann,
supra note 12(B), at 44.
194. The irony, of course, results from the fact that so much of Abortion is devoted to
impugning the motives of the prolife movement as sexist. See supra Part I (A).
195. Nancyjo Mann, founder of Women Exploited by Abortion (WEBA), argues that
the abortion mentality attacks the unique value of female sexuality.... This attempt
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society rather than seeking ways to change society to accommodate
women. 196
A second sexist premise of Tribe's equality argument, as noted by
Professor Smolin, is his assumption "that the goal of equality is to be
equally autonomous. ' 197 This in itself can "be deemed a sexist ideal"
because it accepts "male sexuality ... as the norm," while stigmatizing
"[w]oman's inherently more relational sexuality ... [as] 'abnormal." ' 198
Smolin argues that "to many women the ideal of women being self-
defining and autonomous in the realm of sexuality and reproduction is
repugnant. From this perspective, an argument that abortion regulation
leaves women less autonomous than men becomes irrelevant."
1 99
Another grave deficiency of Professor Tribe's equality argument is his
failure to examine whether the type of equality which he seeks for women-
to be as autonomous as men-actually would benefit women in an overall
sense. Such an inquiry would seem to be a minimal responsibility for
to de-sex women, to separate them from their reproductive potential, has eroded the
natural pride which women enjoy in being able to conceive and bear children-a
creative wonder which no man can duplicate. Instead of praising this unique potential
of women, the abortion mentality belittles it, or at best, dismisses it as commonplace.
Nancyjo Mann, Foreword to REARDON, supra note 188, at xi.
It is somewhat ironic that Tribe in his equality argument treats pregnancy and motherhood
in such a negative way. We referred earlier to his view that even if technology developed so
as to enable the removal of the fetus without killing him/her, the mother still might have the
right to kill the child. See supra notes 85-91 and accompanying text. One of Tribe's reasons
was a reluctance to depend upon methods which give a woman "equality only by rendering
her womanhood inconsequential and marginalizing her distinctiveness as a woman." See supra
text accompanying note 91. Tribe cannot have it both ways. Either a woman's biology is a
burden to her ability to achieve political and social equality and, therefore, abortion is essential,
or a woman's unique biological capacity for childbearing is what most makes her a valuable
human being. In contrast to both of these extreme positions, prolife feminists argue that
women need not bear children in order to be valuable or personally fulfilled, but that female
sexuality, including the unique capacity to bear children, must be respected and accommodated
by society. See Sidney Callahan, Abortion and the Sexual Agenda, in THE ETmIcs OF ABORTiON
(Robert M. Baird & Stuart E. Rosenbaum eds., 1989), at 138-42 (promoting communitarian
and maternal elements of prolife feminism).
196. In fairness to Tribe, it should be noted that in Abortion he does argue for societal
change to make it easier for women "to care for infants once they are born." TRIBE, supra
note I, at 211. Still, Tribe's resolute defense of abortion as a prerequisite to women's equality
is subject to the sexism charge we have described. Moreover, Sidney Callahan points out the
irony in the view which, like Tribe's, supports full abortion rights for women while simulta-
neously calling for greater societal assistance for mothers:
Permissive abortion, granted in the name of women's privacy and reproductive
freedom, ratifies the view that pregnancies and children are a woman's private
individual responsibility.... A child becomes a product of the individual woman's
freely chosen investment, a form of private property resulting from her own cost-
benefit calculation. The larger community is relieved of moral responsibility.
Callahan, supra note 195, at 137.
197. Smolin, sutira note 5, at 638.
198. Id. at 639 (footnote omitted). See id. at 660; McConnell, supra note 12(A), at 1191-
92.
199. Smolin, supra note 5, at 638-39.
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someone desiring to take women seriously. Tribe, however, together with his
prochoice reviewers, appear to be engaged in a "conspiracy of silence"
regarding the burgeoning evidence of the harm which abortion inflicts upon
women.200 Professor David Smolin's review is especially helpful in discussing
this evidence, which is largely found in "the extensive literature [totally ignored
by Tribe]201 recounting women's experience of legal abortion, gathered by both
pro-abortion rights and pro-life advocates."'  To Smolin,
this literature suggests that there is no true clash between the interests
of the woman and of the fetus, because abortion harms both mother
200. Smolin writes that "Tribe appears oblivious to this [issue], possibly because he is so
blinded by the slogan 'safe, legal abortion' that he is unaware of the evidence that 'safe, legal
abortion' has physical and emotional hazards of its own." Id. at 625. See DeWolf, supra note
5, at 259 (noting that "stories of women traumatized by abortion are missing" from Abortion).
The only recognition of this issue which we found in any of the prochoice reviews was a
phrase in Professor Braucher's article that some women feel regret about abortions. Braucher,
supra note 12(B), at 621. She, however, immediately trivializes the point with a footnote
stating that "[m]ost women ... primarily feel relief after abortions and regret tends to be
short-lived." Id. at 621 n.151.
201. We have already commented upon how Abortion reflects Tribe's inadequate schol-
arship. See supra note 28. It may be, of course, that Tribe's silence, rather than reflecting
adversely upon his research, is but one more indication of the prochoice bias which pervades
Abortion. Smolin points out a specific example of "Tribe's selective storytelling" which
supports this explanation. See Smolin, supra note 5, at 624. While Tribe
recounts the story of Becky ... whose death was linked to Indiana's parental consent
law ... [wie are not told ... the contrasting story of Gaylene, who at fourteen
felt pressured by her school counselor and Planned Parenthood clinic to procure an
abortion without her parent's knowledge or consent. According to Gaylene, this
abortion was the cause of an attempted suicide over twelve years later.
Id. (footnotes omitted). There are many other examples of young women harmed by the lack
of parental involvement in their abortion decision. See, e.g., Appendix A of Brief of Focus
on the Family et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents and Cross-Petitioners in Hodgson
v. Minnesota, 110 S. Ct. 2926 (1990).
202. Smolin, supra note 5, at 624. If Tribe ignores the evidence of the harm to women
from legal abortion, he certainly does not ignore the argument that a return to restrictive
abortion laws will have a devastating effect upon women by forcing them to resort once again
to illegal abortion. The horror of back-alley abortions is a steady refrain of Abortion. See
TRME, supra note I, at 35, 40-41, 113, 140, 174-75. Professor Dunlap stresses this point as
well. Dunlap, supra note 12(B), at 45. She congratulates Tribe for helping "ground the abortion
discussion in reality" by correcting its distorted "visual imagery," which "has left out the
pictures of women dying of abortion, while literally oversizing the fetus by contrast." Id.
Dunlap (who, like Tribe, totally ignores the reality of women harmed by legal abortion) also
highlights the illegal abortion issue in a poem she wrote to celebrate a politician who sacrificed





stood up in the New York Legislature ...
and changed his vote from "No" to "Yes"
to repeal the criminal abortion laws
that had killed and maimed as many women
as a small undeclared war ...
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and child. Tribe is searching for a way out of the "no-win battle
that mercilessly pits women against their unborn children. . . " He
'thousands of women
... butchered
in underworld abortion .
When this happens
When someone not possibly directly
in the line of fire, on the hook
of the coat hanger
of the abortion-by-drunk-auto-mechanic
of the abortion-by-jumping-off-the-garage-roof and
dying, age 18
When someone gets it
who isn't s'posed to
Then, say:
Hallelujah....
Id. at 44 n.12.
Our contention that protecting the preborn does not preclude one from valuing women
would appear hard to maintain in face of the harsh reality that when abortion is prohibited,
some women will obtain illegal abortions and some of these will die as a result. Marge Piercy,
for example, warns her readers that the "traumatic circumstances" of the "bizarre" pre-Roe
illegal abortion era "are those in which you will soon be conducting your life, if the forces
of reaction-who call themselves pro-life but value the lives of women not at all-are victorious
in their attempt to deny women the right to choose." Piercy, supra note 155, at viii. We
reject Piercy's characterization of prolifers. It is far too simplistic to point to one consequence
of abortion restrictions-some illegal abortions in which some women die-and say that this
proves that those who seek abortion restrictions do not value women. Prohibiting abortion
has other, beneficial consequences for women. See infra notes 204-16 and accompanying text.
Until one has weighed the harm against the benefit, one cannot say whether women as a whole
will be hurt or helped by abortion illegality. See Smolin, supra note 5, at 624-25 (calling for
evaluation of women hurt and women helped by abortion). We contend that the great likelihood
is that women generally will benefit.
In conducting this balancing process, it is first necessary to evaluate the accuracy of
prochoice statements concerning how widespread illegal abortion was in the pre-Roe era. Tribe
himself is a good place to start. He states that "[bly the late 1960s as many as 1,200,000
women were undergoing illegal abortions each year: more than one criminal abortion a minute."
TRIBE, supra note 1, at 41. Mensch and Freeman point out, however, that "Tribe cited J.
Mohr, Abortion in America: The Origins and Evolution of National Policy 254 (1978), where
this sentence appears: 'By the late 1960's estimates of the number of illegal abortions performed
in the United States each year ranged from 200,000 to 1,200,000."' Mensch & Freeman, supra
note 19, at 927 n.8. They state that "the difference between Mohr's very qualified statement
* and Tribe's coverage of the same issue ... is the difference between a scholarly agenda
and an advocacy agenda." Id. While Mohr may have been more the scholar than Tribe (at
another place in Abortion, TRIBE, supra note 1, at 137, Tribe refers flatly to "the one million
women who had illegal abortions each year prior to Roe"), it must be pointed out that
Professor Smolin identifies Mohr as the historian of choice for "pro-abortion rights advocates."
Smolin, supra note 5, at 628-29. Mohr's figures, as nonspecific as they are, are certainly not
free from doubt. One statistical study concludes that "[a] reasonable estimate for the actual
number of criminal abortions per year in the prelegalization era would be from a low of
39,000 (1950) to a high of 210,000 (1961) and a mean of 98,000 per year." Barbara J. Syska
et al., An Objective Model for Estimating Criminal Abortions and Its Implications for Public
Policy, in NEw PERSPECTIVES ON HUmAN ABORTION 178 (Thomas W. Hilgers et al. eds., 1981).
See REARDON, supra note 188, at 291 ("before legalization there were only 100,000 to 200,000
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never seems to realize that it is abortion itself that creates this
"merciless" conflict, and that the legalization of abortion may
aggravate, rather than alleviate, the human suffering this conflict
creates for women.
203
There is compelling substantiation for Professor Smolin's thesis. Ini-
tially, there is persuasive evidence that abortion entails significant short-
term and long-term medical risks to women. The nature of these risks
illegal abortions per year-a range substantiated by both statistical evidence and the testimony
of aborted women.").
After the incidence of illegal abortion, the next key issue is how many women actually
were physically harmed as a result of obtaining an abortion illegally. Mary Dunlap's poem
states that "criminal abortion laws ... killed and maimed as many women as a small
undeclared war . . . 'thousands of women ... butchered . . . ."' This image of the illegal
abortion era is inaccurate. Evidence suggests, for example, that rather than the "five to ten
thousand" deaths per year claimed by abortion proponents, the actual figure was at most
several hundred. See, e.g., REARDON, supra note 188, at 282-84. Dr. and Mrs. Willke cite the
U.S. Bureau of Vital Statistics for the fact that in 1972, the year prior to Roe, the total
number of reported maternal deaths from both illegal and legal abortions was 39. WIuKE,
supra note 52, at 105.
Even one woman's death, of course, is a tragedy. What some prochoicers, however, have
tried zealously to conceal is that legal abortion also puts women at risk of severe health
complications and death. See infra note 204. We must also not let the preborn fade into
"ghostliness" as we consider what impact maternal death from illegal abortion should have
upon the abortion debate. This is precisely what prochoicers commonly do. Marge Piercy, for
example, in arguing against any change which would "prevent women from terminating
undesired pregnancies by making abortion illegal," says that "[s]ex leads to pregnancy less
certainly than sugar leads to tooth decay, but we do not think of punishing teenagers for
eating fast food by withholding dental work." Piercy, supra note 155, at x. She thus equates
obtaining an abortion with dental work. We have shown instead that abortions kill preborn
persons. If mothers of one-week old babies could kill them only by some procedure which
risked the mother's own life, our society would not legalize killing babies so that some method
safer for the mother could be found. Likewise, we should not make it easier for mothers to
kill their preborn babies. Piercy also equates having sex with eating fast food. This is to
trivialize sex, which, because of its role as an expression of love between a man and a woman,
as well as its potential for creating a new human life, should be accorded great significance.
Finally, Piercy equates prohibiting abortion with punishment. We have shown that instead it
is to hold the sexual partners morally responsible for the consequences of their actions. Doing
so devalues neither, but rather demonstrates that respect for another's importance as a human
being which can only be shown by holding him/her morally accountable.
203. Smolin, supra note 5, at 624 (footnote omitted) (quoting TaE, supra note 1, at 6).
204. See REARDON, supra note 188, at 89-114; Smolin, supra note 5, at 625 n.17. In a
very revealing article, Nat Hentoff recounts an April 1991 segment of 60 Minutes, which
reported on a Maryland abortion clinic. Nat Hentoff, Covering Up Destructive Abortions,
VILLAGE VOICE, June 18, 1991, at 20. The episode described three aftermaths of "safe, legal
abortion" at the clinic: one woman dead; one woman almost completely paralyzed, with no
ability to speak; and one woman who, after almost bleeding to death, required an emergency
hysterectomy. Id. As tragic as these incidents are, Hentoff found equally disturbing the 60
Minute revelation that 'many pro-choice leaders knew about problems [at the clinic] but
didn't want them publicized."' Id. To Hentoff, "a responsible, caring pro-choice leadership
would try as hard as it could to get the news about this clinic spread as widely as possible.
As well as the news about other such clinics in other states. For instance, appalling abortion
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sometimes is not communicated to women contemplating abortions. 20 Women
are also misled, through lack of information about the nature of the fetus,
into thinking "that they can 'get rid of their problem' without killing their
baby."' 201 Eventually, many women discover "the facts of fetal development.
It was a baby, not a blob, not a 'product of conception.' It looked like a
baby.' 207 This realization understandably often produces tremendous grief,
guilt and psychological distress. Such a reaction is poignantly described by
Nancyjo Mann, who in 1982 founded Women Exploited By Abortion
(WEBA).2 8 Mann, who in 1974 had a saline abortion when five and one-
halfmonths pregnant, recounts
Before that needle had entered my abdomen, I had liked myself.
Though I may have had my share of problems, I had seen myself
as basically a good person .... I was a good housewife and a
loving mother. I was happy to be me. But when that needle entered
clinic practices and conditions in Florida, Missouri, and Illinois, among other states." Id. at
21. Instead, there has been silence. Why? Because, Hentoff says, "[s]uch a campaign would
get in the way of [the pro-choice leaders'] continual contrast between pre-1973 back-alley and
coat-hanger abortions and how assuredly safe women are when they now go for abortions."
Id. at 20.
205. Nancyjo Mann, who had a saline abortion, recalls that her doctor told her nothing
about the risks: "Only later did I find out that if he had hit a vein, the saline solution could
have made me violently ill or caused any number of other complications, including death. He
told me none of this. Instead he made it sound like a simple and relatively painless procedure."
Mann, supra note 195, at xv. Incredibly, the Supreme Court in Thornburgh v. American
College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 772 (1986), invalidated a Pennsylvania
statute which required physicians fully to inform women of the medical risks associated with
the contemplated abortion procedure. Such a requirement, however, was recently approved by
the Supreme Court in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 1992 U.S. LEXIS 4751 (1992).
206. Smolin, supra note 5, at 637; id. at 637 n.74; see McConnell, supra note 12(A), at
1195 ("Even the better counselors apparently do not provide accurate information about the
gestational age and characteristics of the fetus the patient is carrying.").
207. Smolin, supra note 5, at 637.
208. A WEBA fact sheet concerning WEBA's history states that:
Women Exploited By Abortion ... became the name of a group of women
from across the USA who had induced abortions and later suffered manifold
symptoms relating to unresolved guilt and grief. The word "exploit" means
"to make use of selfishly or unethically." It aptly describes the experience of
most women who were taken advantage of by abortion industry profiteers
and a society that favors abortion over the loving support of women facing
crisis pregnancies.
WEBA Fact Sheet (on file with The Washington and Lee Law Review).
Today, WEBA has chapters in thirty-three states and eight foreign countries. Nor is it
the only organization that ministers to women suffering from the aftermath of an abortion.
Others include Project Rachel, Open Arms, The Conquerors and Healing Hearts on Abortion-
Last Harvest Ministries. Also indicative of the scope of the problem is the significant number
of books on the topic. See, e.g., PAULA ERVIN, WOMEN EXPLOITED: Tit OTHER VICTIMS OF
ABORTION (1985); PAM KOERBEL, ABORTION'S SECOND VICTIM (1986); MICHAEL T. MANNION,
ABORTIONS AND HEALING: A CRY TO BE WHOLE (1986); NANCY MICHELS, HELPING WOMEN
RECOVER FROM ABORTION (1988); REARDON, supra note 188; KATHLEEN WINKLER, WHEN THE
CRYING STOPS: ABORTION, THE PAIN AND THE HEALING (1992).
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my womb, when it pulled out the nurturing fluid of motherhood
and replaced it with that venom of death, when the child I had
abandoned suddenly began its struggle within me, I hated myself.
It was that fast. Every bit of self-esteem, every value I had held
dear, every hope of which I had ever dreamed-all were stripped
away by the poison of that one vain act. Every memory of joy was




Other evidence of harm to women from permissive abortion laws flows
from their destructive effect upon male attitudes. According to Professor
Steven Carter, one aspect of this may be an increased likelihood of sexual
exploitation, since "the widespread availability of abortion makes it harder
rather than easier for women to withstand the predatory conduct of men.
'210
Professor Michael McConnell provides corroboration by noting that "the
availability of abortion makes it easier for men to engage in sex without
risking any consequences-reason enough for abortion rights to be enshrined
among the tenets of Playboy Philosophy." 21' Abortion encourages male
209. Mann, supra note 195, at xvi. We do not contend that all women suffer psycholog-
ically following their abortions. Smolin suggests that some, influenced by a "peculiar form"
of "radical feminis[t] ... machoism," "bury their guilt" to avoid being "considered weak
and maladjusted." Smolin, supra note 5, at 639. Other women, though, simply may not
experience any guilt. There is the case of Caroline, for example. She aborted twins at eighteen
weeks because having additional children would have derailed her plans to finish college and
advance from her administrative job to an executive position with a Wall Street financial firm.
Tumulty, supra note 19, at 35. "'I don't feel guilty,' she sa[id]. . . . 'I feel that life begins
when a baby is born."' Id. at 37. Caroline viewed her abortion as necessary to escape a
"trap" like the one she had experienced earlier in her life, when she was a struggling single
mother "in a drug-infested New York housing project." Id. at 35, 37. Caroline's positive
attitude toward her abortion is akin to the post-abortion emotions of a group of women who
had illegal abortions in the pre-Roe era. These women "felt they had to find a way to have
an abortion because it seemed the only option that would allow them 'to go on with life, even
at the risk of losing it.' They saw the choice as life-affirming. Afterward they felt relief-
some even exhilaration-at the idea that they had been given a second chance." KATHRYN E.
MAY & ELLEN MESSER, BACK Rooms: Voicas R oM THE ILLEGAL ABORTION ERA at xii (1988).
What are the implications of the fact that some women suffer greatly following their
abortions, while some do not? It might be viewed as suggesting that since one cannot know
in advance which women will suffer and which will not, the better course is to leave that risk
up to each woman, perhaps after informing her of the nature of the risk. We disagree. As
our discussion of the risks of illegal abortion to women has shown, see supra note 202, the
moral imperative of prohibiting abortion is premised in the fact that abortion kills a preborn
person. If a mother of a one-week old daughter could kill her without guilt, experiencing in
fact a sense of release from a "trap," we still would not freely allow her to do so. Nor would
we permit it if the mother informed us that she would be exhilarated by killing her daughter
because of the "second chance" it would create. Preborn persons are entitled to the same
protection. If in a particular case, the restrained woman ends up more burdened than she
would have been had she been able to obtain an abortion, it must be accepted as a not
uncommon characteristic of moral accountability, which more often than not involves some
measure of self-sacrifice.
210. Carter, supra note 12(C), at 2755.
211. McConnell, supra note 12(A), at 1191 (footnote omitted). See Glendon, supra note
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irresponsibility in other ways. As McConnell notes, "[w]hat claim can [a
woman] make on her male partner ... if the bonds of obligation and
responsibility are purely a matter of 'choice' and the 'choice' is hers
alone?" ' 212 The perspective is growing "'that pregnancies and children are a
woman's private individual responsibility. More and more frequently, [one]
hear[s] some version of this old rationalization: if she refuses to get rid of
it, it's her problem.'
' '213
Professor Smolin, in summarizing the reality of abortion for many
women, hopefully delivers a sobering message to Professor Tribe and others
who tout abortion rights as the way to assure equality 14 for women:
12(A), at 57 ("It does not take Sherlock Holmes ... to discern why the strongest supporters
of elective abortion are young men."). Playboy's strong support for abortion rights makes it
particularly ironic that the feminist Tribe recently granted Playboy an interview. The Playboy
Forum Interview, PLAYBOY, Dec. 1991, at 57. Some of Playboy's readers undoubtedly will be
stirred to an even greater proabortion mentality by Tribe's warning that to prohibit abortion
is to open the door for prohibiting contraception. Id. at 58. We have already shown that this
common prochoice argument is insupportable. See supra note 52.
212. McConnell, supra note 12(A), at 1192.
213. Id. (quoting Sidney Callahan, Abortion and the Sexual Agenda, COMMONWEAL, Apr.
25, 1986, at 236). Nancyjo Mann writes that
with abortions easily and legally available ... it is easier than ever for men to
sexually exploit women. When their promises of love end in pregnancy, these
uncommitted and selfish men are free to manipulate women into abortions so as to
free themselves of unwanted commitments. They whine and pout about "doing the
sensible thing," or resort to threats, "If you don't have an abortion, I'll leave you."
In either case the end result is the same: the woman faces the risks and guilts of
abortion alone. And if a woman resists such coercion, her exploiter can simply deny
all personal and financial responsibility for his "unwanted" child, aying, "You're
stuck with it now, baby. After all, you could have had an abortion."
Mann, supra note 195, at xi.
214. There is one area involving abortion in which women are receiving more than equal
treatment, treatment which belies Tribe's argument that equal sexual autonomy for women
through the right to abort is in women's best interest: the disproportionate killing of the
female preborn by sex selection abortions. Tribe reports on the prevalence of this practice in
India, where female children are considered an economic hardship. TRIBE, supra note 1, at
65-66. There is also increasing evidence of this use of abortion in the United States. See, e.g.,
Charlotte Allen, Boys Only, THE NEW REPUBLIC, March 9, 1992, at 16. Allen writes that
"[t]he emergence of sex-specific abortion represents ... an acute dilemma for pro-choice
feminists. What's at stake is a clash of absolutes: a woman's right to an abortion for any
reason versus sex discrimination of the most vicious kind." Id. at 17. The chief response of
American pro-choice leaders has been "denial." Id.
Denial is Tribe's approach as well. He writes that sex selection abortion "rarely happens
in the United States." TRIBE, supra note 1, at 137. Characteristically, Tribe then charges that
those who seek to prohibit such abortions may well have an ulterior purpose: "to advertise
the implied message that women who have abortions do so for inconsequential or even morally
despicable reasons ... ." Id. Tribe thus appears to suggest that abortion for sex selection is
"morally despicable." See id. at 65 ("the discriminatory use of abortion [in India] ... raises
significant moral and ethical concerns about abortion upon request."). If so, one wonders
why? Tribe in Abortion defends the Roe regime of abortion on demand. As pointed out by
Dr. Michael Golbus, "'it is very.hard to make a moral argument about terminations for sex
when you can have abortions for any reason."' Gina Kolata, Fetal Sex Test Used as Step to
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Surveys of aborting women tell a sad story of women who often
want their babies, women who often are aware of abortion as
killing, women who are uncertain of their decisions but who abort
because they are alone or because the father has urged it, or because
they have accepted society's message that this is a reasonable
solution to their "problem." In the end, however, it is the woman-
usually alone-who is left with the realization that she has killed a
baby that she would, under other circumstances, have wanted to
keep and love.
215
This description, founded in women's accounts of their own abortions,
contrasts sharply with Tribe's contention that it is permissive abortion laws
which assure that women are not viewed as "ghosts." We agree with
Professor Smolin that such laws instead "constitute simply an easy way out
for men and society, and a sad continuation of the tradition that relegates
the actual needs and desires of women to second-class status.
' 216
CONCLUSION
In Abortion, Tribe's premise is that prochoicers see only the woman in
the abortion equation, rendering the preborn child a "ghost," while prolifers
fail to see the woman, thereby rendering her a "ghost." Tribe defends
Roe's prochoice perspective as avoiding the dehumanization of either child
or mother. We have shown instead that Tribe's approach dehumanizes both
preborn children and women.
The preborn child is nothing more than a "ghost" to Tribe. The child's
meaning and worth, if they exist at all, are found only in the subjective
eye of his/her mother. The bigger the preborn baby, the more pangs of
sorrow Tribe acknowledges for his/her death, should death be the mother's
choice. Nonetheless, the child, denied any meaningful protection of his/her
life, is effectively dehumanized.
So too, Tribe's autonomous and equal woman is dehumanized. By
requiring that a mother have the autonomy to destroy her child in order to
be considered an equal by society, Tribe releases women from that moral
accountability which is -the hallmark of taking another person seriously. At
the same time, Tribe denigrates the unique reproductive capacity of women,
treating it as an impediment to women's equality. Tribe also completely
ignores evidence of the devastating effect which abortion is having upon
women.
Abortion, N.Y. Thas, Dec. 25, 1988, at Al. Regardless of how Tribe would justify his
apparent inconsistency, we hope that Tribe indeed is repelled by sex selection abortions. We
further hope that one day he will recognize the full ramifications of his abhorrence: that
"from the undeniable truth that it is wrong to kill a baby simply because she is a girl will
emerge the larger truth that it is wrong to kill a baby at all." Jo McGowan, In India, They
Abort Females, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 30, 1989, at 12, 12.
215. Smolin, supra note 5, at 640-41.
216. Id. at 641.
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According legal protection to the preborn from the time of conception
is the only way to take both the preborn and women seriously, the only
way to turn neither into a "ghost." We are not so naive as to think,
however, that this step would eradicate abortion in our society. While
demand for abortion would undoubtedly decrease, 2 7 there still will be
women whose difficult circumstances lead them to view abortion as their
only choice. A comprehensive prolife position must include helping to
provide alternatives. While significant prolife energies are now being devoted
to this effort, 28 at least one prolifer is concerned that the movement's
217. As noted by prochoicer Frances Olsen, the status or lack of it which the preborn
are accorded by the law helps "construct reality." Olsen, supra note 26, at 131. If the law
again begins to protect the preborn as persons, women will begin to view them in that way
too. Cf. REARDON, supra note 188, at 291 (legalization of abortion "caused a ten to fifteen-
fold increase in the number of abortions performed").
218. Professor Glendon states that there are "some 3,400 local [prolife] organizations
that afford financial and other assistance to enable women to continue with their pregnancies."
Glendon, supra note 12(A), at 56. Glendon states that Tribe "does not mention" this effort.
Id. In fact, he does refer to such prolfe activities. What would the reader's prediction be as
to how Tribe characterized them? Initially, it might be thought that Tribe would applaud
prolifers for helping to provide genuine choice to women. But, in view of Tribe's consistent
denigration of prolife motives, see supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text; supra note 214,
it is not surprising that he criticizes prolifers here as well:
Some [prolifers] have sought to intimidate women seeking abortions by setting up
sham pregnancy "counseling" centers. These centers, rather than provide the coun-
seling they advertise, have traumatized unsuspecting pregnant women with films of
abortions and with pro-life literature graphically depicting aborted fetuses. Such
centers have been known to counsel women falsely that abortion often leads to
death, disease, insanity, and sterility.
TNE, supra note 1, at 171.
We do not contend that there are no prolife crisis pregnancy centers which have engaged
in inappropriate conduct. Tribe, though, strongly suggests that all such centers are "sham."
His reasons for doing so corroborate our opinion that Tribe is part of that "conspiracy of
silence" seeking to surpress evidence of the harm which abortion inflicts upon women. See
supra note 200 and accompanying text. In view of the increasing evidence of the trauma
women experience when after-the-fact they realize that they have killed their babies, see supra
notes 206-09 and accompanying text, it would seem that one truly concerned for women's
welfare would want the abortion decision to be fully informed. Instead, Tribe disparages those
who would tell women the truth about the preborn child's development and the grim reality
of how abortion kills. Similarly, in view of the evidence of the grave physical risks of abortion
for women, see supra note 204 and accompanying text, it would seem that one with women's
best interests at heart would want such information disclosed. Instead, Tribe describes as liars
prolifers who communicate these risks.
Tribe also criticizes the prolife movement for not working to provide public services to
make childbirth more attractive. TIRME, supra note 1, at 73. The services Tribe has in mind-
"maternity leaves and benefits ... child care, cash grants, and tax benefits to women with
dependent children," id. at 72-may very well have a part to play in a comprehensive prolife
approach. See infra notes 223-24 and accompanying text. -Tribe's criticism, however, is
unwarranted. To the extent that it reflects a belief that all prolifers flatly oppose deterring
abortion by "making childbirth more attractive," TRmE, supra note 1, at 73, Tribe's view is
untenable. See supra note 12 (where we recount Nat Hentoff's criticism of Tribe for adopting
this stereotype of prolifers). Tribe is on firmer ground in his suggestion that establishing such
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commitment is not deep enough to withstand the strain which would result
from the abolition of legalized abortion on demand.
In a provocative essay, "What If We Win?", Will Liegel, Jr., 219 asks
prolifers to envision such a future:
Witness ... hundreds of thousands of babies born each year only
to grow up without permanent homes or loving parents ... children
shunted from foster homes to group homes to institutions to the
streets ... minors abused by parents unwilling or unable to care
for their offspring ... perhaps even later, ready to take it by force
from a nation that has cheated them. 220
Liegel, speaking specifically to Christians, criticizes them for "focus[ing]
on the value of the pre-born and cast[ing] only a side-long glance at the
needs of these children once they are born, avoiding the real situation of
so many American kids today."'' 1 He urges white Christians seeking to
adopt to move beyond the exclusive preference for a .'normal, white
infant."' He also wonders how "[one] can march for life and yet vote
to disembowel the social service system that we will soon need so desper-
ately."m
Fully to evaluate Liegel's position is unnecessary here. Not everyone
would agree with him as to the nature and extent of the assistance that
should be provided to mothers who give birth rather than abort. After all,
as this article has argued, the primary moral responsibility for the child
rests upon the father and mother. Nonetheless, we believe that a thoughtful
positive response to Liegel's challenge is necessary if our society is to achieve
our goal of treating neither the preborn nor women as "ghosts." Saving
fetuses from abortion and saving mothers from killing their babies are
essential steps?" Terminating one's concern for either child or mother at
programs has not been a priority objective of the general prolife movement. Surely, however,
it is not surprising that the movement's main focus has been to overturn the legal regime of
abortion on demand. Until that is accomplished, to criticize the movement for its perceived
lack of devotion to Tribe's particular ideas for what social programs would best assist mothers,
is hardly fair. For the argument that insistence upon abortion rights undermines any effort to
increase societal assistance to mothers, see supra note 196.




223. Id. at 14. This sentence suggests that Liegel has accepted the stereotype of prolifers
which Nat Hentoff criticizes Tribe for adopting. See supra note 12.
224. As our previous discussion of illegal abortion shows, see supra note 202, we recognize
that generally prohibiting abortion will not guarantee full accomplishment of these goals. This
point is corroborated by a recent article on the revival of a home abortion technique known
as menstrual extraction. Ann Japenga, The New Abortionists, IN HA.LTri, Nov. 1991, at 51.
The article describes the cross-country trek of two prochoice activists to teach the procedure
to various groups of women. The technique, which can be used "to abort a fetus up to about
eight weeks of pregnancy ... is not to be done by a woman on herself, but only in groups
that have been trained in the method." Id. at 52, 53. Should abortion again become illegal,
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birth, however, turns them into "ghosts" at that point. This is hardly
consistent with the compassion for both which underlies the prolife move-
ment.
the difficulty of actually preventing women's use of this method is obvious. See id. at 56.
Proponents therefore hail menstrual extraction as conferring "upon women ultimate control
over the right to abortion." Id. at 52. After one training session, the participants had a
celebratory dinner: "They entered the restaurant with the swaggering attitude of a pack of
middle-aged men who had just won a football game. Conquering heroines." Id. at 57.
Our reaction to this development is quite different. Since menstrual extraction kills
preborn persons just as surely as any other abortion method, we can only view its use as
morally abhorrent. Any abortion, even one performed "[by] housewives ... in their living
rooms," id. at 56, represents a complete devaluation of fetal life. Women are devalued too.
Although the technique's advocates describe one of the needed implements, a speculum, as
having "the shine of self-reliance," id. at 52, the procedure does not reflect "self-reliance"
in any morally commendable sense. If a woman who uses menstrual extraction is "self-reliant,"
then so is a man who deserts his children. Each is more aptly described as self-seeking, as
each is shirking parental responsibilities. The result is self-debasement, the inevitable result of
unfulfilled moral obligations.
One final point should be made. We have previously described the many harmful
consequences of abortion to women. These include physical risks and psychological trauma
following the realization that the abortion in fact killed one's prebom child. The same potential
harm to women exists from menstrual extraction. With respect to physical risks, "all sides"
of the abortion debate condemn the technique as "potentially deadly in the hands of laypeople."
Id. See Richard Lacayo, Abortion: The Future Is Already Here, TDO, May 4, 1992, at 26,
32 ("Many doctors and abortion-rights groups consider ... menstrual extraction far too risky
to contemplate."). Concerning psychological trauma, the risks are especially severe. Abortion
as it is performed in the United States today, in part due to its clinical surroundings, at least
"distances" a woman somewhat from what she is doing. Despite this, many women later
experience guilt and suffering. How much greater will the anguish be for women who through
menstrual extraction have a greater personal involvement in their abortion? The psychological
toll for many women could be devastating. Not, though, for all women. The members of the
group whose celebratory dinner we recounted, for example, seem to have exhibited just the
type of "radical feminis[t] ... machoism" which Professor Smolin described as inducing guilt
suppression. See supra note 209. Such women might very well be able to abort through
menstrual extraction with no subsequent remorse. The fact remains, though, that these women
would have killed their own children to achieve their objectives. We believe that both the
slayers and the slain are to be pitied.
